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ABSTRACT 
TURKISH ETHOS OF THE KURDISH QUESTION: 
A CASE STUDY ON THE TURKISH SOCIETY IN THRACE-TEKİRDAĞ 
Orhan, Yunus Emre 
MA, Department of Political Science and International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Talha Köse 
March 2016, 104 pages 
This thesis makes use of the Ethos of Conflict (EOC) theory to analyze the resistance 
of the Turkish society to change in the sense of the Kurdish question. It assumes that 
in the course of conflict both members of the parties involved in the conflict develop 
a socio-psychological infrastructure (SPI) to adapt the conflict and without 
transformation within the SPI, building peace is not completely possible. In the light 
of this extensive theoretical framework, the fundamental hypothesis of this thesis was 
formulated, as there are some shared beliefs in the Turkish society in terms of the 
Kurdish question leading to resistance to change. To explore this hypothesis, 20 field 
interviews with local opinion leaders were personally conducted in Tekirdağ, a 
periphery zone of the Kurdish conflict. The thesis starts with the development of the 
theoretical framework of the study. Then it provides a mapping of the Kurdish 
question.  This is respectively followed by the analysis of the content of the EOC with 
respect to the Kurdish question, the functionality of the EOC, and the functionality of 
the SPI. Finally, I discuss the limitations of the thesis and the recommendations for 
further research regarding the need for change in the Turkish ethos.  
Keywords: Resistance to change, ethos of conflict, Kurdish question, socio-
psychological infrastructure, conflict resolution.  
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ÖZ 
 
KÜRT MESELESİNİN TÜRK ETOSU: 
TRAKYA-TEKİRDAĞ’DAKI TURK TOPLUMU ÜZERİNE ÖRNEK BİR 
ÇALIŞMA 
 
Orhan, Yunus Emre 
MA, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd.Doç.Dr. Talha Köse 
Mart 2016, 104 Sayfa 
  
Bu tez, Kürt Meselesi bağlamında Türk toplumunun değişime karşı direncini, Çatışma 
Etosu Teorisinden istifade ederek analiz etmektedir. Bu tez, çatışma boyunca, çatışma 
içindeki her iki tarafın üyelerinin çatışmaya adapte olabilmek için sosyo-psikolojik  
bir altyapı (SPA) geliştirdiğini, ve bu SPA değişmediği takdirde barış inşa etmenin 
mümkün olmadığını varsaymaktadır. Bu teorik çerçeve ışığında, tezin temel hipotezi 
“Türk toplumunda, Kürt meselesi hakkında, değişime karşı dirence sebep bazı 
paylaşılan inançlar vardır” olarak formülüze edilmiştir. Bu hipotezi incelemek için, 
Kürt meselesinde periferi bir bölge olarak kabul edilebilecek Tekirdağ’da, yirmi yerel 
kanaat önderi ile şahsen saha mülakatı gerçekleştirilmiştir. Tez, çalışmanın teorik 
çerçevesini geliştererek başlamakta. Sonrasında Kürt meselesinin haritasını 
sunmaktadır. Bunu sırasıyla Türk etosunun içeriği, Türk etosunun fonksiyonelliği, ve 
SPA’nın fonksiyonelliği analizleri takip etmektedir. Son olarak da, tezin kısıtlamaları 
ve etostaki değişime ihtiyaçla ilgili gelecek çalışmalar için tavsiyeleri tartışmaktadır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Değişime karşı direnç, çatışma etosu, Kürt meselesi, sosyo-
psikolojik altyapı, çatışma çözümü  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Purpose of the Research 
This study is an exploratory and descriptive inquiry of the elements of the 
Turkish ethos of the Kurdish conflict. It makes use of the Ethos of Conflict (EOC) 
theory (Bar-Tal, 2013) to analyze the resistance of the Turkish society to change in the 
sense of the Kurdish question. It assumes that in the course of conflict, both members 
of the parties involved in the conflict develop a socio-psychological infrastructure 
(SPI) to adapt the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007) and without transformation within the SPI, 
building sustainable peace is not completely possible (Bar-Tal, 2000; Kelman 2007; 
Lederach 2003; Mitchell 2014).  
In light of this extensive theoretical framework, the thesis concentrates on the 
public dimension of the peace process and seeks to understand impact of the ethos on 
peace process. The central argument of this study was formulated as there are some 
shared beliefs in the Turkish society in terms of the Kurdish question leading to the 
resistance of Turkish society to change. In order to analyze profoundly the shared 
beliefs (Gordon, 1990; Markus and Kitayama, 1994; Bar-Tal, 2000) of Turkish 
members, the central questions of the research are formulated as follows: “How does 
the society respond to the peace process? What is the impact of ethos on responses? Is 
the Turkish society resistant to change? If yes, why? If not, why?” To make the 
analysis more in-depth, the following sub-questions have been determined:  
 What is the general perception regarding the Kurdish conflict that arises 
from the ethos? 
 In the context of the ethos, how do each shared belief relate to one another? 
 What is the content of the Turkish society’s ethos (goals, security, de-
legitimization, self-image, victimization, patriotism, unity, peace)?” 
 What are the definitions of peace in use by participants? 
 How do participants perceive the peace process?  
 What are the participants’ criteria for the success of the peace process? 
 How do participants define “they” and “we”? 
 What do they think about the victimization of the Turks and Kurds? 
 How do they explain the outbreak of the conflict? 
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 What are their thoughts regarding the demands of education in the mother 
tongue and the self-government of the region? 
This inquiry provides an overview on the concept of the ethos of conflict 
(EOC), the public peace process, and reports the findings from qualitative in-depth 
interviews in which members of the Turkish society in periphery zones (in Tekirdağ 
as a representative sample for the Thrace region) were asked about their shared beliefs 
associated with the Kurdish question in Turkey. Throughout my research, I make use 
of the Ethos of Conflict theory, developed by Bar-Tal, arguing that a society involved 
in intractable conflict forms and creates a particular ethos that is shaped and influenced 
by the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). The ethos gives orientation to a society and is shaped 
and formed by societal shared beliefs (Bar-Tal, 2000). The ethos can be observed in 
cultural products, the educational system, historical narratives, and public discourse 
(Bar-Tal, 2003).  Hence, my central argument is that there is a wide ranged shared 
beliefs at the societal level that prevent building sustainable peace, and allow 
resistance to change in an intractable conflict. 
I chose the Kurdish question as a case study, for this research. Turkey was in a 
peace process until July 2015. Today, the general discourse and tendency of academic 
and political actors dominate that there is social agreement on achieving the peace 
process both in the Turkish and Kurdish society. In the thesis, the argument on social 
agreement is not entirely falsified but criticized. Throughout my research, I have 
observed that there are still various negative shared beliefs or attitudes at the societal 
level among the Turkish people in Turkey. In my view, determining these shared 
beliefs in order to develop policies is not sufficient, but necessary for achieving 
sustainable peace. These shared beliefs may provide knowledge about the society 
involved in conflict, and these widely shared societal beliefs may contribute to the 
formation, strengthening, and maintenance of the social identity of the group. Over 
time, these shared beliefs begin to act as a mechanism that preserves the existing social 
structure. They motivate and guide the social acts of group members. In this sense, in 
order to accomplish a peace process, Turkey needs transformation and change due to 
the functionality of societal shared beliefs. 
So, the ultimate purpose of this study is to address the socio-psychological 
dimensions of implicit unwillingness to change, respectively by: 1) framing theoretical 
knowledge about the concepts used in the field (i.e. shared beliefs, EOC, public peace 
process, collective memory), and 2) providing new data from dynamic shared beliefs 
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of the Turkish party members associated with the ongoing peace process and the past, 
in other words, making implicit the shared beliefs, and explicit the attitudes regarding 
the Kurdish Question. 
The Research and its Contributions to the Field 
This thesis contributes to the literature on conflict resolution by focusing on 
the Kurdish Question, providing new data from Turkish party members’ shared beliefs 
on the Kurdish question and their perceptions of the current peace process. The central 
question of the thesis seeks to show the multi-dimensional characters of the conflict. 
Unfortunately, the Kurdish question is generally issued by political-historical theories 
(Marcus, 2007; McDowall, 1997; Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997; Gunter, 2004; Somer, 
2004; Bozarslan, 2008), and sociological theories (Yeğen, 2006; Ergil, 2009). Its 
multilayered character is generally avoided in such analyses. Studying the Kurdish 
question by using conflict analysis tools is nearly a brand new tendency in the literature 
(see Çelik, 2009). Thus, the thesis seeks to fill in a gap in the research on the dynamics 
of resistance to change in the Kurdish Question. 
While the research provides new data from the field, it also demonstrates the 
current conditions of the peace process in June 2015, prior to the revival of the armed 
conflict. Even though it is crucial to research social attitudes and behavior separately, 
the study of the ethos or the whole structure of societal beliefs enable a more 
comprehensive and complete perception of a society. To conduct further longitudinal 
research on this issue, the present study may provide a general picture from 2015. 
Overview 
This thesis is organized in four chapters.  
Chapter one, Mapping the Conflict in Turkey, by making use of Paul Wehr’s 
conflict mapping guide, primarily summarizes the conflict history by classifying into 
nine periods. Respectively, (1) brief early history (until 1923), (2) formation of 
republic of Turkey – radicalization and rebellions period (1923-1938), (3) silence 
period (1938-1961), (4) restoration of the problematic (1961-1978), (5) foundation of 
the PKK, propaganda, and terror (1978-1989), (6) guerilla war (1989-1999), (7) 
Capture of Abdullah Öcalan and ceasefire period (1999-2004), (8) PKK back to the 
stage (2004-2012), (9) peace process and the revival of the armed conflict – current 
situation (2012 – to the present). By determining the core issues and the primary parties 
of the Kurdish conflict, it presents conflict resolution techniques and peace initiatives 
of the primary parties. 
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Chapter Two examines the literature in the field relevant to socio-psychology, 
ethos of conflict, and public peace process. Additionally, it develops the central 
assumptions and arguments of the research. This research argues that conflicts are 
dynamic phenomena, they may escalate or deescalate due to the complex relations of 
behaviors and attitudes (Ramsbotham& Woodhouse &Miall, 2012). So, conflicts have 
multi-dimensional, and CR has multi-phase characteristics (Cox, 1986; Galtung, 1967; 
Tonge, 2014). Peace, therefore, is not an event; rather, it is a process (Lederach, 2003). 
Within this framework, the thesis emphasizes that the socio-psychological 
infrastructure of the conflict makes difficult the resolution of conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2000; 
Bar-Tal, 2013; Gordon, 1990). In addition, without transformation within the EOC, 
building peace on which the society embarks is not completely possible (Bar-Tal, 
2003). 
Chapter three explains the methodological framework of the inquiry. In 
addition, it limits the scope of the research and evaluates the limitation of the research. 
Chapter Four presents the findings from the analysis of in-depth interviews 
structured by guiding questions. It categorizes all findings of the in-depth interview 
findings. Then, it analyzes the data and discourse in the light of the theory. Each actor’s 
willingness and openness to discuss the problematic of the Kurdish question, and the 
need for change are also argued in this chapter. 
In the conclusion, I review and summarize all findings of the research, and 
offer possible policy implications. 
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CHAPTER I 
MAPPING OF THE KURDISH QUESTION 
 
Paul Wehr defines conflict mapping as a “first step in intervening to manage a 
particular conflict. It gives both the intervener and the conflict parties a clearer 
understanding of the origins, nature, dynamics and possibilities for resolution of the 
conflict” (Wehr, 1979: pp.9) Indeed, conflict mapping is an efficient pattern of 
demonstrating the multi-layer characteristics of a particular conflict. It provides a 
comprehensive and applicable methodology to analyze any conflict type, from 
international to interpersonal levels and to give a quick picture for a conflict climate. 
However, it should not be forgotten that every particular map demonstrates the 
standpoint and perspective of the author of the map.  
A large majority of the Kurds lives in contemporary Turkey, Iran, Syria and 
Iraq. Recent research in the last decades illustrates that the largest portion of the total 
population of the Kurds lives in Turkey (around 50%) and the Kurds are the largest 
ethnic minority (around %15) in Turkey; they mainly live in southeastern part of 
Turkey (McDowall, 1997). 
In general terms, two important features shaped the trajectory of the Kurdish 
question: the Turkish state’s rejection of Kurds’ existence and the occurrence of its 
far-reaching challenge to the Turkish state including various revolts during the 
formation of modern Turkey (1923-1938), and guerrilla combat from 1978 to the 
present. (Bozarslan, 2008).  
Hence, this chapter, through its own lenses, aims to provide mapping of the 
Kurdish Conflict by looking at the brief history and the origins of the Kurdish conflict. 
It seeks to describe the conflict and offers peace initiatives in order to solve the 
conflict. 
1.1.  Conflict History  
1.1.1. Brief Early History (Until 1923) 
Historically speaking, the roots of the Kurdish conflict go back a long way – to 
the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution period in the early 1900s (Bozarslan, 2008). After 
the rapidly dissolving of the Ottoman Empire because of the World War I, the Kurds 
was distributed into various new states (Turkey, Syria, and Iraq). In the sense of 
formation of Turkey, Kurds mainly fought together with the Turks during the 
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independence of war of Turkey, remaining loyal to the authority of Ottoman Empire 
without demanding any kind of separatist demand (Karpat, 1985).  
In the early 1920s, the conventional Kurdish elites greeted Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk’s assurances associated with the Turkish–Kurdish solidarity, the liberation of 
the Mosul, and the protection of the position of caliphate in the future state structure 
to be established after the end of independence war of Turkey (Bozarlan, 2008). 
1.1.2. Formation of Republic of Turkey (1923 – 1938) – Radicalization 
and Rebellions Period 
In August 1922, the Turkish military forces won the war and new secular 
Turkish state was officially established in Ankara, on 29 October 1923. In the early 
years of the Turkish republic, Kurdish population had been represented in the new 
parliament by tribal chiefs of their region and were not evaluated as minority 
population in Turkey (only Orthodox Greeks, Orthodox Armenians, and Jews were 
recognized as minorities; see the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923). During the new reforms 
and laws, Kemalist ideology was accepted as founder regime of the state. The new 
governance was using the term “Turkish” in order to define citizenship, rather than 
ethnicity. Indeed, most of Turkey’s ethnic groups – such as Caucasians, Bosnians, 
Lazs, and so forth – had easily acknowledged the term, even consisting of some 
portions of the Kurdish society (Somer, 2004; Karpat, 2000).  
However, things would not go as planned. Due to various political, 
demographic, geographic, identity-related, and social-economic factors, Kurds posed 
the radical challenge to the new formation of modern Turkey. The most important 
outcomes of breakdown the relationship between the Turkish state and Kurds had been 
17 soul-shattering rebellions from 1924 to 1938. The three most significant of them, 
the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, the Ararat Rebellion in 1930, and the Dersim 
Rebellion between 1936 and 1938, inflicted a deep wound on both history of Modern 
Turkey and Kurdish nationalism (Bozarslan, 2008). These rebellions demonstrated 
that Kurdish religious and political elites of the Republic period were not able to 
mobilize the entire population in the region. In addition, it must be mentioned that 
most of these revolts were not ethnic, rather religious, but they were realized by 
ethnically Kurdish people.  
What were the distinctive elements led not to integrate Kurds into the new 
Turkish state? Many document and most researchers suggest that there are four main 
reasons for the rupture. First, the new Kemalist ideology was considering linguistic 
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variances as a potential threat to the new nation-building (Bozarslan, 2008). Second, 
abolition of the caliphate led to vehement reaction of Kurdish religious elites, 
considering the caliphate’s existence as the only lasting pillar of the common ground 
of the Kemalist-Kurdish relations. Third, Kurdish elites unrestful due to final status of 
Mosul. (Bozarlan, 2008; Ergil, 2009). In addition, there were some other reasons 
alongside the mentioned reasons motivating Kurdish rebels. First, the Kurdish 
population was demographically the biggest portion of the whole population in 
Turkey. Second, the Kurdish population was geographically and homogenously living 
in the southeastern region of Turkey, which was difficult for the central administration 
because of the distance. The third was the tribal and feudal social structure of the 
Kurdish society (Bozarslan, 2008; Mango, 1994; Mango, 1999; Somer, 2005; Ergil, 
2009). 
Rebellions during the formation of modern Turkey had remarkable impact on 
the Kurdish policies of the Turkish state. Bozarslan (2008, pp. 338) mentions that the 
decision makers in Ankara were to a large extent unaware of the emerging Kurdish 
opposition and could have not taken serious security precautions to prevent these 
rebellions. As a consequence, the Turkish state put down rebellions by making use of 
severe military applications, and implementing several laws (transforming Kurdish 
names of places, limitations on using Kurdish language, and so forth) in order to delete 
the Kurdish history and identity and in order to build a Turkish nation state (Marcus, 
2007). Nevertheless, whether these policies were correct or not, they were not only 
implemented towards the Kurds, but to any individual or group who struggled to accept 
the new norms, since the parliament lists show that there were some conventional 
political Kurdish elites in the parliament (Somer, 2004).  
1.1.3. Silence Period (1938-61) 
Turkey was governed by a one-party regime until the election of 1946. After 
the Dersim rebellion, speaking of Kurdish nationalism openly became rare, even 
during the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) period in which various democratic 
laws were implemented, few religious bans were abolished, and the constitution was 
transformed to ease the pressure of the state on its citizens. Many leaders of the 
rebellions such as Nuri Dersimi, Ihsan Nuri, and the Cemilpasazada brothers had 
understood that there is no other choice than to print their experiences in order to 
establish a written legacy, which had tremendous impact on the systematization of the 
future Kurdish nationalism (Bozarslan, 2008, pp.343). They had realized that the 
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impossibility of achieving their dreams in short-term periods. Thus, they should have 
created a collective memory. 
Three important factors can be stated to understand the silence in that period 
(Bozarslan, 2008, pp.343). First, harsh military applications of the state had killed or 
exiled the main leaders of the armed rebellions. Second, unsuccessful Kurdish 
nationalist attempts in Iraq in 1943 by the Barzani Rebellion and the collapse of the 
Mahabad Republic in 1946 in Iran had weakened the Kurdish resistance in the Middle 
East. Finally, since the birth of political pluralism in Turkey and the policies of the DP 
provided new opportunity windows for the Kurdish elite. To illustrate, the party 
implemented returning policies for many Kurdish deportees. In addition, broader 
economic integration of some Kurdish elites into the other parts of Turkey, the DP’s 
political agenda on broadening relations with the Kurdish tribes, and new possibilities 
for many Kurdish youth to get an education in Istanbul and Ankara can be evaluated 
as important instances of the DP period.  
However, the DP period did not last very long. The Turkish army organized a 
coup d’état in 1960, and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes along with two of his 
ministers were hanged. This showed that although the DP had won the elections in this 
period, secular elites were still powerful in the state – particularly in bureaucratic and 
military positions. 
1.1.4. Restoration of the Problematic (1961-1978) 
During the 1960s, the writings of the 1950s mentioned above circulated among 
some marginal younger groups and some Kurds were integrated into the new ideas. 
On the other hand, due to Ataturk’s well-known Nutuk (Speech) (1927), consisting of 
few of Ataturk’s letters to Kurdish elites during the independence wars, offered news 
sources for some Kurds in terms of self-awareness (Bozarslan, 2008). Although some 
signals of a new Kurdish revival were emerging by the end of the 1950s, such as the 
Society for the Liberation of the Kurds (Kürtleri Kurtarma Cemiyeti), the apparent 
revival of the Kurdish nationalism got on the stage during 1960s with the help of the 
1961 constitution which extended civil rights (Anter, 1990, pp. 1-60).  
Specifically, there were two other important reasons behind the new Kurdish 
revival. The first one was the external factor, namely the Kurdish national movements 
in Iraq conducted by Mustafa Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, which had 
significant impact among few of the Kurds in Turkey, especially the youth generation 
(Bozarslan, 2008). In fact, Barzani’s movement had allowed Kurds to reassess the 
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current situation of the Kurdish language and to interpret Mustafa Barzani as the moral 
authority of the Kurds (Yavuz, 2001). The second was the internal factor, the 
developing left-wing movement in Turkey. This socialist and communist movements 
affected Kurdish youth and large portions of Kurdish society in urban places and Kurds 
have started to discuss their unrest in the sense of social and economic inequalities 
among the regions of Turkey (Yegen, 1996; Marcus, 2007). Later, many Kurds joined 
the Turkish Workers Party (TIP, Türkiye İşçi Partisi) established in 1961.  
There were three major reasons behind this interaction. The first reason was 
that the left-wing ideologies were advocating social and economic equality. Hence, it 
could be the best and new way to challenge the dominant political order for Kurds by 
using the marginalized and underdeveloped condition in the southeast region (Somer, 
2004). The second reason was that the left-wing ideologies were also challenging  
Turkish nationalism (Bozarslan, 2008). The third reason was that the Marxist left 
ideology was providing new universal insights to the Kurds. Hereupon, in Bozarslan’s 
words, 
Under the influence of Lenin and Stalin, whose works were now being 
translated into Turkish, the left in Turkey accepted the legitimacy of the 
‘national question’ (which became a synonym for the Kurdish 
question), and ‘the rights of the oppressed peoples to determine their 
own fate’…Moreover, it also renewed a sense of Turkish–Kurdish 
fraternity, i.e. the fraternity of ‘oppressed classes and oppressed 
peoples’…Marxism-Leninism played much the same role as the 
discourse of Islamic fraternity had done during the War of 
Independence. (Bozarslan, 2008, pp.346) 
With regards to the 1970s, Kurdish students were dissatisfied with the TIP’s 
program concerning the Kurdish issue. The party was banned after the 1971 military 
coup d'état and most of the members of the party including the Kurds were arrested. 
Immediately after the coup regime, few Kurdish socialists came to think that an armed 
revolution would be the only way to struggle to gain their rights. Abdullah Ocalan, the 
founder of the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane, Kurdistan Workers Party), was one 
of these Kurdish socialists in the early 1970s.  With the disappointment due to the 
failure of Barzani’s movement in 1975 in Iraq, Abdullah Ocalan and his friends 
established the Ankara Revolutinary Higher Education Student Association (Ankara 
Devrimci Yüksek Öğrenci Derneği) in order for the indoctrination of their ideologies, 
which was shaped by establishing a socialist governance in Turkey. Then, Ocalan 
recruited his first supporters in 1974. Ocalan will have defined this early stage in his 
writings in the 1990s as “schooling days” (Ocalan, 1996).  
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1.1.5. Foundation of the PKK, Propaganda, and Armed Conflict (1978-
1989) 
In early 1977, Ocalan and his supporters started to extend their propaganda 
campaign in Kurdish-populated cities such as Diyarbakır, Mardin, Tunceli, Ağrı, and 
Bingöl. During this time, Ocalan and his friends attempted to gain authority by 
challenging other Kurdish and Socialist groups (Karayılan, 2014). On November 27, 
1978, Partîya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Worker’s Party) was founded 
under the leadership of Ocalan in Diyarbakır, through the lenses of a socialist doctrine 
(Durna, Goktepe, and Keeling, 2008). The PKK’s main objective was stated as saving 
the Kurdistan region from colonialism and fighting to feudalism. Hence, this objective 
defined the Turkish state as invaders and supporters of the state as traitors (Karayılan, 
2014). According to the Ocalan, Kurdish traditional elites were supporters of the 
Turkish state, and were responsible for the feudal southeast region. They were, 
therefore, initial targets for the PKK’s armed conflict (McDowall, 1997). The end of 
the 1970s were the years where the PKK sought to steal tribal chiefs’ thunder over 
Kurdish population.  
During these years, there was deep conflict between leftist and rightist political 
groups, and the PKK was solely one of these small groups, hence did not draw the 
attention of Turkish army forces (Özcan, 1999). On September 12, 1980, the Turkish 
army forces took control of the Turkish state, under the leadership of General Kenan 
Evren. Although, Abdullah Ocalan moved to Syria in order to establish the PKK’s 
headquarters before the military intervention, the coup had tremendous impact on the 
PKK as 1.790 PKK militants had been arrested and 73 of them were executed under 
the death penalty (Karayılan, 2014).  
The PKK organized its first congress in Lebanon in June 1981 with the 
participation of approximately 200 militants (Özdağ, 2010). There were two decisions 
of the congress: (1) establishing headquarter in Northern Iraq and Syria, and (2) 
withdrawing the PKK militants from Turkey. Later, the second congress gathered in 
August 1982 and the final decision was starting a long-term armed conflict against the 
Turkish state by taking the Mao’s model as an example (Bal and Özkan, 2006). This 
model consisted of three strategies: strategic balance, strategic defense, and strategic 
offense (Özdağ, 2010). Then, until 1984, the PKK preferred to concentrate on rural 
areas and feudal chiefs rather than urban areas as rural regions were less impacted by 
the imperialist campaigns and they were relatively less protected areas than urban 
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regions (Özdağ, 2010). Starting in 1984, the PKK extended its objectives and targeted 
Turkish military forces and other governmental places. Kurdistan Liberation forces 
(HRK, Hêzên Rizgarîya Kurdistan), the military wing of the PKK, were established in 
1984 (Karayılan, 2014) and organized two attacks on Gendarme posts in Siirt and Eruh 
on August 15, 1984. These attacks will be mentioned as the starting point of the PKK 
terrorism in the future (Bal and Özkan, 2006). 
In October 1986, in Lebanon, the third congress of the PKK was organized and 
the HRK replaced by the Kurdistan People’s Liberation army (ARGK, Arteşa 
Rizgeriya Gelê Kurdistan) to proceed for propaganda, recruitment, and armed struggle. 
During these years, many people who rejected to integrate with the PKK were killed 
and a large number of children were compelled to join the army forces of the PKK 
(Bal and Ozkan, 2006).  
1.1.6. Deep Armed Conflict (1989-1999) 
Adopting a socialist ideology and abandoning Marxist ideology, the PKK 
demonstrated ideological transformation at the end of the 1980s (Bal and Özkan, 
2006). In the future, because of the failure of the Soviet Union, the PKK would 
abandon socialist perspectives, as well. Between 1989 and 1999, the PKK initiated in 
guerilla conflict with the Turkish army and during these years, the PKK became one 
of the biggest terrorist-guerilla organizations in the world. As from 1989 to the early 
1990s, a great amount of new militants (According to PKK sources: 30.000, other 
sources: 15.000 (Marcus, 2007; Özdağ, 2010) joined the PKK military forces.  
In the early 1990s, the PKK focused on intensifying its military forces to get 
prepared well for more deadly attacks. Although the village guards were threatening 
the PKK insurgency, the target of the PKK was changed from village guards to Turkish 
military and police forces by the decisions of the fourth congress on December 1990 
(Özdağ, 1999), because killing village guards, who worked for the Turkish state, would 
weaken the PKK’s authority on Kurds in the region (Tapan, 2007). On the other hand, 
this target change would increase the visibility of the PKK on the international stage 
and might provide a positive image for it (Rees, 1992). In the same year, the PKK 
organized its fifth congress in May 1990, in Lebanon and declared that the objective 
of the PKK was concentrating on establishing an independent-socialist Kurdistan 
(Karayılan, 2014).   
In response to these increasing terrorist attacks, the Turkish army conducted 
large-scale counter-terrorism operations in the second half of the 1990s. This period 
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was written in history as the most intensive PKK terrorist actions in Turkey. 
Statistically, on the one hand, 40.799 terrorist attacks have been operated by the PKK, 
5.564 government personnel and 4.727 civilians were killed; on the other hand, 
Turkish security forces captured 13.484 PKK militants, killed 27.136 (Şener, 2010). 
Although there have been two ceasefire periods, attacks from the both sides intensified 
during this period until 1999. 
1.1.7. The Capture of Abdullah Ocalan and The Ceasefire Period (1999–
2004) 
Although he had been seeking asylum from Russia, Greece, and Italy, Ocalan 
was captured in February 1999 in Kenya as a result of Turkey’s diplomatic pressures 
(M. Gunter, 2000). As might be expected, the capture of Abdullah Ocalan caught the 
PKK’s leadership off guard. Later, the PKK organized the sixth congress without 
Abdullah Ocalan and declared that Ocalan was still the general secretary of the PKK 
organization (Karayılan, 2014). 
In 2000, during his defense, Abdullah Ocalan transformed his discourse 
completely. He apologized to the Turkish society, called to the PKK to end armed 
struggle in order to seek political solutions. Immediately afterwards, the PKK 
leadership welcomed this message and declared that they were leaving Turkey. 
Throughout his trial, he proposed a new objective including “the Democratic 
Republic” program to end the Kurdish conflict in which all of the nations would live 
in peace. Thus, this rhetoric was projecting for Kurds to work for a justly democratic 
Turkey, rather than an independent Kurdish state (Kirişçi, 2004). His trial was due on 
June 29, 1999 and he was condemned to the death penalty by the Turkish court. Shortly 
after, however, the death penalty was revoked by the Turkish parliament in 2002.  
The European Council added the PKK to the list of terrorist organizations in 
December 2001 (Bal and Özkan, 2006). This meant losing international support for 
the PKK militants. In April 2002, the PKK executives organized the eighth congress 
and altered the organization’s name to the Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasîya Kurdistan 
(KADEK, Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress). KADEK declared that the 
new objective of the organization was to pursue non-violent activities and political 
solutions in defending Kurdish people’s rights.  
Since the number of the attacks from the PKK had radically decreased, the 
problem was considered to have ended. However, the regional context in the Middle 
East was dramatically changed due to United States’ presence in Iraq that started in 
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November 2003. Although the diplomatic pressures of the Turkish state, the Kurds in 
Iraq became de facto allies of the United States. Then, the PKK militants once again 
altered their names to the Kongra Gelê Kurdistan (KONGRA GEL, Kurdistan People 
Congress) and declared that they would initiate armed struggle in self-defense 
(Marcus, 2007; Özdağ, 2010).  
1.1.8. PKK Back to the Stage (2004–2012) 
2004 was the year that the PKK returned to the stage. In June 2004, the PKK’s 
wing the Hêzen Parastina Gel (People’s Defense Force, HPG) took control of the 
militant group and declared that the ceasefire was ended. HPG alleged lack of solution 
to the Kurdish question as a pretext of the revival of the attacks (Bal and Özkan, 2006). 
A large number of attacks re-increased during this period, especially by using urban 
bombings (Marcus, 2007). In 2007, the Turkish state enabled the Turkish military 
forces to carry out cross-border operations in Iraq. In 2009, the AKP government put 
its “Kurdish opening” policy in place by aiming the disarmament of the PKK and 
political resolution to the Kurdish conflict. However, due to the PKK and the Turkish 
Army’s mutual escalating attacks, especially the Habur process and the PKK’s 
Reshadiye attacks, made heavy weather of the Kurdish opening (Pusane, 2014). 
Immediately afterwards, the Turkish government applied a new strategy 
against the PKK, on the one hand struggling militarily with the PKK, on the other hand 
holding a dialogue process open with the PKK’s political wing, the BDP. This strategy 
was after a video was released to the media, demonstrating the BDP deputies’ close 
relationships with the PKK militants (Pusane, 2014).  However, despite these 
developments, the Turkish government officials proceeded to leave the door open for 
the possibility of re-assessing the talks with the Abdullah Ocalan. As a result, at the 
end of 2012, the peace process between the parties started with the Oslo Process, and 
talks between the National Intelligence Agency and the PKK followed.  
1.1.9. Peace Process between 2012-2015 and the Current Situation 
On December 28, 2012, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that 
talks with Abdullah Öcalan began. This was the first time a top official had reported 
the talks in Turkey’s conflict history. The meeting began at the end of 2012 and some 
of the deputies of the BDP were allowed to talk with Abdullah Öcalan. In this process, 
Hakan Fidan, the chief of the National Intelligence Organization, served as the 
government’s representative and deputies of the BDP was carrying messages from 
Abdullah Öcalan to the PKK executives (Aras and Duman, 2014).  
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These meetings revealed some significant political transformations regarding 
the Kurdish conflict. First, it showed that the Turkish state transformed its approach 
associated with the Kurdish politician and Öcalan’s role in resolving the Kurdish 
question. Second, this period was the first time state officials openly suggested that the 
Kurdish conflict could not be resolved by making use of military instruments. Third, 
Ocalan’s calls seemed to be willingness to discuss political solution. Fourth, aside from 
political support, many NGOs in Turkey stated that they are willingness to help both 
parties of the conflict in order to solve the problem (Aras and Duman, 2014). 
However, during this period, the peace process witnessed various worrying 
developments. Protests for the Siege of Kobane, intractable conflicts in Syria, ISIL 
threat in the region, and the YPG’s (the PKK’s militia wing in Syria) integration into 
the US forces in external dimension; Gezi Protests, general elections under tension, 
and parallel state trial in internal dimension were the developments which escalated 
the tension between the Turkish state and the PKK (SETA, 2016). At last, Suruç 
Bombing, which was blamed ISIL affiliated group in Turkey for the bombing, was the 
end point of the peace process. On July 22, 2015, the PKK killed two policemen in 
Şanlıurfa  and the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state has begun 
and are still going on (SETA, 2016).   
All of these developments in the history reveals that there are still several 
obstacles in resolving an intractable conflict and finding a lasting solution. However, 
to study these obstacles are out of the scope of this thesis. The important point that one 
can point out now is as to what the core issues of the conflict in sum are. What were 
the peace initiatives during these mentioned periods? Who are the parties of the 
conflict? How did they define the conflict? What were their strategies to deal with the 
conflict? The next part will answer these questions.  
1.2.  Core Issues of the Conflict 
Identifying the core issues of the conflict helps analysts understand and give 
meaning the nature of the conflict. Additionally, it provides a map for the peace-
building phases of the conflict (Wehr, 1979). Theoretically, a conflict will emerge and 
develop around more issues. In historical narratives, they might generally point out 
one or two single issues, but in reality, these issues should be seen as the tip of the 
iceberg. Every conflict emerges around various complicated issues. If it is transformed 
into an intractable character, it is possible that various new issues can be constructed 
during decades. 
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As outlined by Çelik (2009), there are various core issues between the State 
and citizens, between the State and the PKK, and between Turkish and Kurdish groups 
in Turkey. These three categories have various economic, political, security related, 
social, and relational issues. In the economic category, the Kurdish conflict is affected 
by the damaged economic infrastructure, the delayed economic development, 
ownership disagreements, an illegal economy, and the unbalanced economic budget. 
As for security, the presence of village guards, the existence of the PKK, the presence 
of land mines, and the continuation of sporadic violence can be counted. Among the 
social issues of the Kurdish conflict, unemployment and poverty, weak social care, 
weakened social fabric and trauma, and conflict over collective rights (especially the 
linguistic rights) can be demonstrated as vital. Political issues can be listed as political 
parties and the various intellectuals’ focus on the issues of the existence of strong 
coercive institutions, as well as election quotas, disturbed human-rights practices, 
legitimacy problems, education in the mother tongue, clashing views on the nature of 
the state whether it is unitary or federal, political participation, the end of violence, the 
release of Öcalan, and the transformation of the governmental system into a federal 
state structure. 
1.3.  Parties in the Conflict and Peace Initiatives 
Conflict parties can be defined as decisional units of the conflict, which 
involved directly or indirectly in the conflict (Wehr, 1979). In the case of Turkey, in 
general, the two conflicting parties are: first, the PKK, a massive movement that uses 
weapons and violence in the name of defending Kurdish rights in Turkey, second, the 
government of the State that has used security services and military to deal with the 
terrorism and to get its own interests in the conflict.   
1.3.1. Parties in The Conflict 
1.3.1.1.The PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane, Kurdistan Workers 
Party) 
In this thesis, the PKK is the only party, which is placed in the opposite of the 
Turkish state. It was established by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 by intending to mobilize 
Kurdish individuals to form a Kurdistan in the Southeast region of Turkey. The years 
between 1970 and 1978 are the years of the pre-PKK, which is known as Pre-PKK 
(Bozarslan, 2008). PKK has executed its early activities and achieved its founding 
process between 1978 and 1984. The years between 1984 and 1999 are the years with 
escalation and de-escalation trends through the PKK’s propagandas, terrorism and 
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guerilla war. In 1999, Abdullah Ocalan was captured (Marcus, 2007). Years between 
1999 and 2004 have passed with ceasefire. Between 2004 and 2012, the PKK returned 
the stage and combatted in high intense. The peace process started in 2013 with the 
Oslo Process and ended in June 2015. Today, the PKK consists of both non-violent 
and violent groups and they have left separatist demands. High-position 
representatives of the PKK assert that the peace will be achieved when problems over 
the Kurdish language in education and the Kurdish identity recognition by the Turkish 
constitution and imprisonment of Öcalan. 
 
Figure 1.1. Attack Types of the PKK until 2013 (Source: Global Terrorism 
Database, START, accessed on 01/23/2016) 
 
Figure 1.2. Target Types of the PKK until 2013 (Source: Global Terrorism 
Database, START, accessed on 01/23/2016) 
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1.3.1.2. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) 
The TSK has the largest standing force in Europe (Evans-Pritchard, 2004) and 
the second largest in NATO (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009). Therefore, as one 
guesses a large portion of the expenses are allocated for the TSK in Turkey. TSK has 
always been deeply active in politics; hence, it has been always an actor in the Kurdish 
question. As indicated in Part I, TSK has interpreted itself as the undisputed protector 
of the Kemalist regime in Turkey and has interfered in politics when it perceives any 
necessity (Zacharia, 2010). Over thirty years, the TSK has applied a large number of 
military attacks on the PKK. During this period, the PKK was perceived as a virus 
transmitted by foreign power that aimed to seperate the unity of Turkey (Copur, 2009).  
1.3.1.3. The Government and Politicians 
Turkey has a parliamentarian government system ruling by multi-party 
democracy with both a prime minister and president. Legislative branch consists of 
550 memberships. Although few former governments perceived the Kurdish question 
as a regional security problem, in many cases, as Özal, the 8th President of Turkey 
from 1989 to 1993, and todays’ political parties perceive the Kurdish question in the 
way of social phenomenon. Today, the contemporary state actors specifically AKP are 
the most important decision-makers in the peace process. AKP has started Kurdish 
Opening process in 2009 and the peace process in 2013. During this period, there were 
three other opposition parties in the Assembly. First one is Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 
(Republican People’s Party, CHP) – the founder party of the Turkish state, and 
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party, MHP) – Turkish nationalist 
party in Turkey. On the other side the BDP (Democracy and Peace Party). From the 
beginning of the Kurdish question, governmental side of Turkey has implemented 
various policies to struggle with the issue such as diplomatic pressures on PKK, border 
security and cooperation treaties with neighboring countries as Syria and Iraq, 
democratic reforms, EU adaptation reforms, economic investments to the region, tax 
deductions and incentives, allowing education and publication in Kurdish language, 
and so forth. Peace initiatives of the governmental side will be presented in further 
detail in section B. 
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1.3.2. Conflict Resolution Strategies of the Turkish State and Peace 
Initiatives 
1.3.2.1.The TSK and Its Strategies to Resolve the Conflict 
Although it has transformed recently, the TSK’s interpretation of the Kurdish 
question has been originated in “greed-based” perspective (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2002), rather, it rejected the existence of a Kurdish question. In the sense of this 
interpretation, the TSK was conducting various harsh military operations to the 
Kurdish “secessionist” movement. From the beginning, Kurdish militants were 
considered as puppets of external forces that wanted to separate Turkey’s unity and to 
stop progress (Copur, 2009).  The Kurdish question, therefore, has been denied, rather, 
it was an only a regional-security problem (Marcus, 2007). As mentioned in previous 
conflict-history part, between 1983 and 2002, after the coup, the TSK was the official 
administrator of the resolution strategies towards the PKK. In this period, southeast 
region of Turkey were declared as “State of Emergency Regions” (McGregor, 2007). 
For a long time, the TSK has believed that in order to finish the problem of terrorism, 
one more severe operation will be enough to root the PKK away (Marcus, 2007).  
At the beginning of the PKK attacks, both the TSK and politicians undervalued 
the organization. They perceived the PKK as a small group of bandits impacted by the 
Iraq-Iran war. Since the PKK attacks regularly raised, the TSK become to focus on the 
issue as an anti-terrorism task. Immediately afterwards, special military units began to 
serve in the southeast region (Kundakçı, 2004).  In the early years, small number of 
the TSK soldiers and the PKK militants were killed in the conflict. In order to damage 
the PKK’s attacks and efforts in the rural areas, the TSK began to implement a new 
strategy, which is known as the “Village Guard System”.  
1.3.2.1.1. The Village Guard System 
The system was put into practice in 1985. With this new system, the 
government chose several village guards candidates and trained them to secure their 
villages from the PKK militants officially. The recruitment was twofold. First, the 
villagers could join the system voluntarily. Second, the TSK and sub-governor 
gendarme forces could choose someone to be a village guard in order to demonstrate 
their loyalty to the Turkish Republic. Over the years, the village guard members were 
active in most of the security operations of the TSK, even sometimes they involved in 
attacks against the PKK. 
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1.3.2.1.2. Internal Displacements 
As mentioned earlier in the section on conflict history, the PKK began its 
propaganda to get a logistical support and recruit new memberships specifically in 
rural areas in the southeast region due to the lack of security in these areas (Kirişçi, 
1997). Since PKK’s suppression on people to give their support to the PKK, the 
Turkish state preferred to displace village people in order to cut the support, without 
regard to people in villages have supported willingly or unwillingly. Evacuating 
process proceeded to 1997 (Arslan, Demir, and Duru, 2004).  
1.3.2.1.3. Cross-Border Operations 
The cross-border operations, by the TSK, were initially launched in 1983 to 
Iraq, by 7000 TSK soldiers (Gunter, 1994). Afterwards, several cross-border operation 
have launched in 1980s and 1990s based on intensity of the PKK attacks generally into 
northern Iraq and rarely into Iran. In 2000s, there are also large number of cross-border 
operations carried out by the TSK, especially in 2008 and 2012 (see TSK press 
releases: http://www.tsk.tr/20_ingilizce_tsktr/index.html )  
1.3.2.2.The Turkish Government and its Strategies to Resolve the 
Conflict or Peace Initiatives 
Although there were some approaches in the governmental side that were 
synonymous with the TSK’s greed-based approach, the Turkish state cabinets and 
parliaments mostly perceived Kurdish question originating in “grievance-based” 
perspective (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002) and attempted to improve economic and 
democratic conditions in the region and developed several conflict resolution tools 
(See Table 1.3.). More or less all of the major parties in Turkey have conducted 
researches, offered economic packages, mentioned social problems of the region, and 
suggested political solutions regarding the Kurdish questions (Akçura, 2009). In this 
part, I will to examine the last five leadership periods (Ozal Period, Demirel and Çiller 
Period, Ecevit Period, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu period) by pointing out peace initiatives 
and general characteristics of these periods. 
The ten year period between 1983 and 1993 can be named as the Özal period 
in Turkish political history. After the three years of the Kenan Evren’s coup regime, 
Turgut Özal was elected as the prime minister of the Turkish state until 1989. In 1989, 
Turgut Özal became the 8th President of the Turkish State.  
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Table 1.1. Conflict Resolution Tools of the Turkish State 
 
CR Tool Brief Explanation 
Security of 
Borders and 
Treaties 
Turkey signed the Border Security and Cooperation Treaty 
with the government of Iraq in 1983 and the very same 
protocol with Syria in 1985 (Oran, 2001). This treaty 
provided Iraqi, Syrian and Turkish military forces chances 
in order to secure their borders effectively by the right to 
chase borders at any insurgency (Özdağ, 2010).  
Adana Treaty 
With diplomatic pressures, threat of war, and the 
mediation of Mubarak, the current president of Egypt, 
Turkey persuaded Syria to sign Adana Treaty in 1998. The 
treaty included a protocol to take Öcalan out of Syria 
(Karakaya, 2009). 
The PKK as a 
Terrorist 
Organization in 
the Official Lists 
of US and EU 
The PKK was added to the US and the EU’s official 
terrorist organizations after the Ocalan’s capture (Bal and 
Özkan, 2006). 
GAP 
GAP (Southeastern Anatolia Project), starting with the 
Özal period, multi-sector development project was 
designed to improve social and economic standards of 
people in the south-east region, including health, 
agriculture, irrigation, energy-production, infrastructure, 
education, and health.  
Rehabilitation 
Project 
In 1999, in order to provide an opportunity for families 
who wanted to turn back to their villages, Ecevit put 
“Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project” into 
practice (Marcus, 2007) 
Tax Reductions 
and Investment 
Projects in the 
Southeast Region  
From the late 1990s to the present, the Turkish state 
encourage investments by offering reduced taxes, 
discounts for electric usage, and low interest credits for 
many business companies in the southeast region. 
Opportunity for 
Returning Home 
 The Turkish state implemented “repentance bills” many 
times to allow the PKK militants for granting amnesty or 
reducing sentences . 
Newruz 
Celebrations 
In Turkey, celebrating Newruz was banned several times 
due to the PKK’s propagandas in these celebrations. It was 
assigned as a national holiday in Turkey in 1995 but 
reoccurring clashes between the Turkish security forces 
and Kurds led it to be banned again until 2009. From now 
on, celebrating Newruz is legal in Turkey. 
State Emergency 
Regions 
This strategy used almost twenty years and was abolished 
in 2002 
European Union 
Reforms 
Including a wide-range of consolidations and regulations 
in terms of social life, democratic rights, and minority 
rights, the Turkish state had passed several EU adaptation 
packages from 2002 to the present. 
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Özal was the president that focused mainly on the improvement of the Turkish 
economy through initiating free market policies, democratic reforms, and relations 
with the European countries (Güzel, 2010). Regarding the PKK’s early activities, Özal 
interpreted the problem as a consequence of Iran-Iraq war (Evrensel, 1998). This might 
be understandable as the PKK’s activities were not intense during his prime minister 
period. Nevertheless, the Kurdish question entered in the Turkish state’s political 
agenda for the first time during the Özal’s period. In this period, the public was 
confronted the new explanations and suggestions differed from the official thesis. Ozal 
indirectly recognized the Kurdish reality by explaining his Kurdish roots from his 
grandmother’s side. Second, Erdal Inonu, the head of the SHP, and some other 
politicians declared that the Kurdish question could not be solved by military means. 
Özal was an important actor for the conflict resolution that developed direct fruitful 
relations with the Kurdish leaders in Iraq, namely Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani 
(Ergan, 2002). However, the PKK’s activism intensity rose during Özal’s presidency 
period (1989-1993). From the beginning, according to Özal, the Kurdish question was 
a matter of democracy instead of ethnic matters. Thus, the solution should be shaped 
by political means, rather than military (Marcus, 2007). Although the TSK was still a 
dominant actor over Turkish politics during this period, contrary to the TSK’s 
ideological clichés, Özal was insistent on removing limitations on usage of the Kurdish 
language and in 1991, writing and speaking in Kurdish was set free. The year before 
he died, he had been working on a general amnesty strategy for the PKK militants. In 
these years, everybody, even Abdullah Öcalan, believed a resolution of the Kurdish 
question was so close (Marcus, 2007). However, in 1993, on April 17, Turgut Özal, 
the 8th president of Turkish state, lost his life due to a (suspicious) heart attack and the 
death of Ozal weakened the hope of a democratic resolution of the Kurdish conflict 
(Kirisci and Winrow, 1997). 
On the other hand, there was an important civil initiative in the TBMM and this 
civil initiative was relatively more independent from the PKK organization than 
present conditions. Although there was an armed-conflict with the PKK during that 
period, it was not as deep as the conflict at present times. If the politicians of that 
period could have keep the civil Kurdish politicians in the TBMM, the principal of 
negotiation with the legitimate actors would have been achieved. At the same time, 
there were a number of civil politician, who were not engaged with the PKK or 
violence, within the RP political camps. They would also be viewed as the legitimate 
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actors for negotiations. However, on one hand, there was a strong military domination 
over Turkish politics at that time, on the other hand the defensive-nationalist 
tendencies of the public were the main obstacles for well-designed peace initiatives. 
The central threat for the politicians at that period were that the possible perception of 
making concessions to terrorism within the society.  
The seven year period between 1993 and 2000 can be named as the Demirel 
period in Turkish political history. Suleyman Demirel, 9th president of Turkish State, 
was constantly careful in relationships with the TSK, due to his several experiences 
with coup d’états (Dündar, 1999). Hence, Even though he has some statements 
regarding the Kurdish conflict, Demirel was not actively engaged in recognition of the 
Kurdish question both in his prime minister period (1991-1993) and presidency period 
(1993-2000). Rather, once he stated that acknowledging the Kurdish question was 
synonymous with separating Turkey (Dünya Bülteni, 2009). In 1993, Demirel became 
the 9th president of Turkey and his colleague Tansu Çiller served as the prime minister 
until 1996. After death of Özal, Turkey could not maintain its political and economic 
stability due to early elections and a post-modern TSK coup d’état came true in 1997. 
In addition, the PKK terrorist attacks was incredibly increased and reached its peak 
level (Sener, 2010; Ergil, 2009). Although Çiller mentioned political and social means 
to resolve the conflict such as offering a Kurdish television channel or getting a 
Kurdish education as an elective course, she reversed her decision due to pressure from 
the opposition parties and favored military means to end the conflict, as TSK’s main 
perspective (Sezgin, 1993). Later on, a large number of TSK operation were conducted 
towards the PKK. The entrance of HEP deputies with the SHP to the TBMM was a 
big chance to give a start to discussions and negotiations. However, the crisis of 
Kurdish oath-taking ceremony led to political crisis. Similarly, rupture of the relations 
between HEP and SHP due not to finish OHAL within the region removed the 
possibility of dialogues. Thusly, the political polarization in terms of the Kurdish 
question within the TBMM led to period of close of Kurdish-nationalist parties, 
respectively, HEP, OZDEP, HADEP, DEHAP, and DTP (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997).  
Bülent Ecevit accepted the 1997 coalition of the Turkish state as a smaller 
party. At the very short term, Ecevit was the temporary prime minister of the Turkey 
until 1999 general election, and Abdullah Öcalan was captured during his term. In 
1999, the capture of Öcalan provided a very important chance to Ecevit for gaining 
majority of the vote in the general election. Actually, the capture of Abdullah Ocalan 
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was an important chance for several reforms because the capture was meant as the 
defeat of the PKK. So, this perception would be useful to dispose of the perception of 
making concession to the PKK. However, the public was not ready for the reforms and 
there were several polemics within the TBMM at that period. Immediately afterwards, 
Ecevit became the prime minister of Turkey until 2002 by leading a coalition 
government. However, the Turkish economy was still in trouble and turned into a crisis 
in 2001. During Ecevit’s period, the Kurdish question was considered to have ended 
due to Öcalan’s capture. According to Ecevit, there was no Kurdish question, rather 
an issue of regional poverty. Nevertheless, constitutional amendment restricting 
freedom of expression in languages was prohibited by the law, which was an important 
step. However, in 2002, the parliament went through an early election. 
In brief, until AKP come to power alone, political parties in Turkey possess 
various approaches regarding the conflict. DYP, MHP, and DSP were following the 
traditional line in terms of the conflict. According to them, there was no Kurdish 
question, rather a terror and security problem. During this period, this traditional line 
was represented by Demirel and Çiller. Yilmaz, next head of the ANAP after Ozal, 
could not maintain the brave and radical attitude of Ozal in terms of the conflict. 
Contrary to the mainstream right parties, the RP, the national vision movement, 
evaluated the regime problems as central causes of the Kurdish question and 
interpreted the wrong policies of the Turkish state as fundamental obstacles to establish 
sustainable solidarity. On the other hand, the leftist political parties of the period, SHP 
and CHP, were systematically publishing analytic reports in terms of the Kurdish 
conflict by defending the mistake of understanding the Kurdish question solely as a 
security question. According to them, the concepts such as democratic rights, 
citizenship, identity, and respect for all cultures should entered to the center of the 
debates in terms of the Kurdish question. MHP, from past to today, always define the 
question as an exterior terrorism and security problem. Despite everything, the TSK 
was still the most important actor for the conflict, and Ozal and Demirel were the most 
important actors in the political arena.  Decreasing the suppression of the TSK requires 
constitutional policies but coalition governments and sensitive balances among them 
were not sufficient to reach constitutional steps. Thus, although there were few cease-
fire periods, the Turkish state could never start the negotiation process with the 
opponents. The interpretation of neither the Turkish society nor the decision makers 
was adequate to solve the Kurdish conflict.  
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In 2001, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) 
had been established by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current President of Turkey, and 
a group of Welfare Party colleagues. Erdoğan won a landslide victory in the 2002 
general elections and became the prime minister of Turkey until 2014. After eleven 
years or since the Özal period, Turkey turned to be governed by a single-party and this 
situation proceeds due to AKP’s success in the regular elections of 2007, 2011, and 
2015.  AKP’s governance during fourteen years has brought political and economic 
stability, and several fruitful transformations in terms of foreign affairs, democratic 
progress, relations with the EU and international relations of Turkey (Goldfarb, 2011).  
As mentioned above, there was a lack of societal/political support and a 
suppression of the TSK as important obstacles in order to solve the Kurdish question. 
However, the EU orientation intention, EU reforms (See Table 1.4.), to come to power 
alone provided important chances to the AKP to turn these disadvantages into 
advantages. Henceforth, the AKP was the only actor for decision-making. In 2005, 
negotiation process between EU and Turkey officially started. As regards to the 
Kurdish question, Erdogan’s period has witnessed a large number of - perhaps the most 
intense period for peace initiatives (See Table 1.4.) – democratic and social 
developments to resolve the conflict such as freedom of press in Kurdish language, 
restoration of the names of some cities and towns, and many economic investments in 
the southeast region of Turkey (Arsu, 2009). According to Erdoğan’s government, the 
Kurdish question should be considered mostly as a democratization manner. The other 
important point that the AKP regularly emphasized is the separation between PKK 
terrorism and the Kurdish question.  
In terms of the Kurdish question, there were still many obstacles to develop 
more efficient tools to resolve the conflict. First, Turkey was in the most influential 
economic crisis in history, since 2000. In addition, Turkey was the victim of the Duzce 
earthquake of 1999. Hence, establishment of the new economic system was the 
primary issue for the AKP officials. Second, the AKP needs evidence for its maturity 
to strengthen its power. Therefore, developing policies for the candidateship of the EU 
was the other important goal for the AKP.  
 
 
 
 25 
 
Table 1.2. Legal and Administrative reforms liberalizing Kurdish Identity and 
Language in Turkey in the post-1999 period 
 
Reforms Date 
Constitutional amendment restricting freedom of 
expression in "languages prohibited by the law" 
October 2011 
Allowing broadcasting in Kurdish March 2002 
Allowing private course in Kurdish August 2002 
Abolishing prohibit on Kurdish personal names June 2003 
Public TV station broadcasting in Kurdish January 2009 
Allowing electoral campaigning in Kurdish March 2010 - September 2013 
Establishment of Kurdish language and literature 
programs at university level 
January 2011 
Allowing elected Kurdish language courses at the 
fifth grade 
September 2012 
Allowing limited defense in Kurdish at courts January 2013 
Allowing Kurdish language education in private 
schools 
September 2013 
Abolishing "Oath of Allegiance" (to the Turkish 
nation) recited by primary school students 
September 2013 
Allowing q,w, and x in computer keyboards September 2013 
Allowing village names revert back to their originals September 2013 
Third, as an international factor, the US was in warfare with Iraq and this 
warfare conditions lead to uncertainty of the geo-political conditions of the Kurdish 
question. Since the overthrowing of Saddam would allow pan-Kurdish movements in 
the region, the AKP government should guardedly take its steps. Therefore, taking 
these three important conditions into the consideration, although there were several 
developments in terms of the Kurdish question, various important brave steps could 
not have been achieved such as the future of the PKK or the general amnesty of the 
combatants of the PKK.  
The Erdogan period witnessed armed conflict (2004-2008, 2015-present), 
Kurdish opening period, and the peace processes. The solution formula of the AKP 
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has nearly always presented the concept of the citizenship of Turkey as an umbrella 
concept for all identities in Turkey.  
1.3.2.2.1. Kurdish/Democratic Opening 
In 2009, the AKP government proclaimed its will power to initiate a 
Kurdish/Democratic opening associated with the prolonged Kurdish conflict by 
defining a new manner with respect to the Kurdish society. In addition, this opening 
was meant to bring upon the willingness to openly discuss the Kurdish question. 
However, although there are several political attempts as seen in Table 1.4, the process 
could not lead to negotiations among the parties due to the absence of a clear plan and 
a framework determining how the discussions among the parties should proceed or 
what the limitations of the opening. Rather, who the primary legitimate actor should 
be was unclear. Thus, the lack of adequate arrangement of both Turkish and Kurdish 
sides before starting the opening process leads to more marginalization of the radical 
political sides of the Kurdish side. The speeches of the Kurdish sides were obliged to 
act as a mouthpiece for Abdullah Ocalan. 
1.3.2.2.2. Peace Process 
In December 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan announced that direct contact with 
Öcalan and the representatives of the PKK started in order to establish a peace process 
in Turkey. During the solution process, negotiations’ ultimate purpose was to end 
violence with the PKK, ceasefire, taking weapons from the PKK, and reintegrating the 
members of the PKK into the society. In the process, negotiations were realized among 
the national security organization of Turkey on one side, and Abdullah Öcalan – the 
founder of the PKK – deputies of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), and few 
officials of the PKK on the other side. However, the peace process started in 2013 with 
the Oslo Process and ended in June 2015 (SETA, 2016). 
1.3.2.2.3. Wise Persons Commission (WPC) 
The most important resolution tool to establish a peace process was the Wise 
Persons Commission. The WPC can be seen as the first civil and comprehensive 
attempt in Turkey to explore citizens’ minds and to learn what citizens’ thoughts are. 
The commission was chosen to start its activities by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan in April 2013. They worked in different regions of Turkey. The WPC can be 
shown as a an insider-side of the resolution strategy that seeks to influence and inform 
the public associated with the peace process, to explore the expectations of the public 
from the solution process, and to enhance empathy among the ethnic, religious, and 
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cultural identities in Turkey. The commission was separated into 7 groups in order to 
work in seven geographical regions in Turkey (DPI, 2013). Although the WPC’s 
function was to prepare society for negotiations, the influence of it was limited because 
the middle-range efforts cannot be spread through all of the levels of the society. (I 
will further discuss this situation in the data analysis chapter).  
1.3.2.2.4. Davutoglu Period 
In 2014, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former foreign secretary, became the prime 
minister within the current peace process. However, either internal developments 
(Gezi protests (Göle, 2013), parallel state discussions (Dalay, 2014), and presidential 
system discussion) or external developments (protracted-international conflict in 
Syria) both negatively impacted the peace process in Turkey and the context in the 
region has transformed. Today, Davutoğlu and Erdoğan still proceed to separate the 
PKK issue from the Kurdish question, insisting on the necessity of accordingly dealing 
with the PKK terrorism. Therefore, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have still a challenging 
issue on their hands and a long-term period to solve the intractable conflict. According 
to the thesis’ main argument, the Turkish society is not ready to confront the brave 
steps needed for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict.  
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1.Introduction 
As defined previously in the introduction chapter of this study, the present 
research seeks to discover what the content of the Turkish society’s ethos of conflict 
is. The former chapter sought to demonstrate the multi-dimensional characteristics of 
the Kurdish conflict. This chapter seeks to form a theoretical basis for the inquiry. The 
central focus of the research deals with the conflict, which was at the cease-
fire/agreement stage. In the peace-making stage, resistance to change is the most 
crucial obstacle for transforming a conflict from a violent to a peaceful climate. 
Reaching sustainable peace requires assessment of all aspects of conflict. All political, 
sociological, global-contextual, psychological, and socio-psychological dimensions 
should be taken into the consideration to develop a comprehensive insight for 
resolution.  
In order to nderstand and explain the causes of resistance, there is a myriad of 
theories in the literature (Bar-Tal, 2007; Collier, 2003; King, 1997; Sisk, 1997; Walter, 
2002). Acknowledging the importance and impact of all dimensions, I would rather 
use socio-psychological models to give meaning to the resistance to change. In my 
view, generally the socio-psychological aspect is disregarded by many scholars 
analyzing conflict. This research aims to understand resistances at the societal level by 
using Bar-Tal’s EOC theory.  
This chapter, from macro lenses initially provides a brief introduction to define 
the conflict concept and indicates the multi-dimensional nature of CR. Second, it seeks 
to understand the peace phenomenon within the multi-dimensional conflicts and forms 
a basis for the thesis’ central focus: public peace process. Third, it discusses one of the 
most important dimensions that include several obstacles for establishing sustainable 
peace, namely the social-psychological dimension by making use of Daniel Bar-Tal’s 
theory of ethos of conflict. 
2.2.Defining the Concept of Conflict  
Early theorists in the field, such as Morton Deutsch, one of the most visionary 
scholars in the field, classified conflict between destructive and constructive (Deutsch, 
1973, pp.17). According to this normative understanding of the CR, destructive 
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conflicts refer to conflicts that should be kept away but constructive conflicts suggest 
a valuable dimension of creativity of the human being. How then should one conceive 
conflict? First, the theoretical definition is made by Lewis Coser, the first sociologist 
that sought to bring structural functionalism and conflict theory together. For Coser, 
conflict is “a struggle over values, and claims to scarce status, power and resources in 
which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals” 
(Coser, 1956, pp.8). To give a starting point for a field, emphasizing on values and 
scarcity makes this definition very important in the physical sense but it is not 
adequate. Himes extends this definition and states, “Social conflict refers to purposeful 
struggles between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove 
opponents and gain status, power, resources, and other scarce values” (Himes, 1980, 
pp.14). Deutsch evaluates conflict as a situation that can be observed at the occurrence 
of incompatible activities (Deutsch, 1973). In my thesis, I prefer to use the concept of 
conflict in the meaning of Pruitt and Rubin’s (1986, pp.5) definition, “A conflict is a 
perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot 
be achieved simultaneously”. In my view, the emphasis on the concepts of 
“perception”, “belief”, and “interest” in this definition gives a departure point to 
analyze conflict.   
There may be various origins leading to destructive conflict that can be 
observed in situations such as social change, economic differentiation, psychological 
development, cultural formation, and incompatible goals. During conflict, the context 
of the conflict, actors of the parties of the conflict, the level of conflict, the issues 
struggled with as a point of disagreement – they can be fact-based, value-based, 
interest-based – may changeover. In other words, conflict is dynamic. Conflict may 
escalate or deescalate due to the complex relations of behavior and attitudes 
(Ramsbotham & Woodhouse & Miall, 2012). Therefore, various stages may form the 
conflict’s environment. 
In order to analyze stages of the conflict, the conflict escalation and de-
escalation model provides a helpful graph for analysts. As mentioned previously, 
conflicts should be considered as dynamic processes and they can expeditiously 
change and transform. Escalation and de-escalation waves of conflicts are very 
unpredictable and complex processes (see figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1. Conflict escalation and de-escalation Model (Source: Ramsbotham & 
Woodhouse & Miall, 2012) 
Within this framework, various factors can cause fluctuations in the graph such 
as secondary conflicts with the parties involved in the conflict, or transformed 
strategies and goals, or context transformation, or issue transformation, or structural 
transformation (Vayrynen, 1991; Aggestam, 1999; Montville, 1993; Cunningham, 
2006). The importance of the model in thinking about CR finds its reflection in the 
search of conflict analysts. The answer of “What should we do?” or of “Which tools 
do we need for resolution?” can be found by answering the question as to what stage 
one is. 
Conflicts are living organisms and hence there are ups, downs, ends, and 
breaks. The normal distribution curve starts with the difference stage. This level 
includes the initial differences in all parts of all social changes and developments. The 
following stage, namely contradiction, means to impossibility of the latency of the 
dispute on differences. In addition, this level demonstrates the occurrence of 
contradiction among the parties involved in the conflict. At the polarization level, 
relationships among parties take an antagonistic form and they not only dispute the 
differences, but also advance their manifests. At culminating point, by using direct 
violence, the war or armed conflict begins and this is the most harmful level of the 
conflict. However, as one might guess, these changes do not take a shape linearly. 
Finally, violence, war, and ceasefire stages can be considered as conflict containment 
stages that aim to end fight and prevent killings (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse & Miall, 
2012). 
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The four deepest levels of the conflict curve, namely difference-contradiction 
and normalization-reconciliation, include both structural and cultural changes for 
peace- building (Fisher and Keashly, 1991). The polarization and agreement stages 
need elite peace-making processes. However, peace- building and peacekeeping 
efforts do not work in the stages of violence and ceasefire. The peace- keeping 
strategies are most useful to stop direct violence at these stages. At the culminating 
stage of war, the only way of ending war is with the strategies of war limitation (Fisher 
and Keashly, 1991). From the viewpoint of this terminology, the deepest four levels, 
in turn difference, contradiction, normalization, and reconciliation can be considered 
conflict transformation stages aiming to transform issues, actors, structure or goals of 
the parties. The polarization and agreement stages can be considered conflict 
settlement stages focusing on negotiations, third-party interventions to settle 
conventions and agreements (Fisher and Keashly, 1991).  
2.3.  Defining Peace as a Public Process 
What creates a war “ending” or peace “starting” are themselves very 
complicated questions. All peace and CR research aims to improve theories and 
knowledge for these two tricky questions. In the sense of superficial understanding 
while “war” is a phenomena associated with bloody conflict, “peace” is considered a 
“non-war” or absence of conflict (Tonge, 2014). This understanding is a largely static 
and bereft of dynamism. Defining peace in such a narrow lens that it tells nothing about 
what peace should consist of, or avoid or about what action one needs to take (Cox, 
1986). The concepts of war and peace may point to more complex definitions.  
Galtung argues that in the literature the concept of peace has been superficially 
seen as a common label for non-war situations (Galtung, 1967). Yet, today one can 
easily see, war and peace are much more difficult to define. Considering the term peace 
as a utopian idea provides no prescription for CR. Defining peace as a process implies 
that the transformation from violence to non-violence or permanent endings of 
conflicts cannot be considered as linear conditions. Rather, it should be understood 
that they are subjects for non-linear conditions. The concept of peace process is a 
comprehensive label that indicates a multi-dimensional character of the permanent 
eradication of conflicts. 
Concerning this issue, Tonge states preconditions to give a start peace 
processes can be specified as follows: “involvement of most combatants; the cessation 
of conflict (peace); the formulation and implementation of political arrangements, 
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whether interim or comprehensive accords; the prevention of the reignition of conflict 
(process) and the attempted political management of differences” (Tonge, 2014, pp.7). 
Although these factors reflect a comprehensive picture, Darby and MacGinty offer a 
slightly different checklist for elemental constituents of peace processes. Their offer 
involves five different components: 1) A willingness to address the key issues of 
conflict; 2) the end of violence; 3) prolonged agreement; 4) involvement of parties in 
process; and 5) conducting well-intended negotiations (Darby and MacGinty, 2003, 
pp.2). 
In this study, I acknowledge Darby and MacGinty’s definitions as my central 
assumption regarding precautions because of their understandable terminology. It is 
clear all of these insights indicate that peace is a clustering of time, ideas, 
transformation, changes and developments. Therefore, using the term “peace process” 
admits that conflicts do not cease suddenly, but are transformed, changed, managed or 
may be resolved over a long period of time.  
The myriad of works associated with conflicts and peace processes tends to 
analyze the political dimensions of peace processes and the parties or groups that are 
involved in negotiations. In Lederach’s view, the literature needs some extra 
categorizations within the peace process and political dimension should be considered 
as only one dimension carried out by elites, namely a top-down approach (Lederach, 
1997). There should be two more running phases of the peace process (See Figure 2.2). 
The central assumption of this categorization is that peace processes should be sold to 
the masses at large after negotiations among elites. Although he acknowledges that the 
leaders of both parties involved in the conflict are most encouraged and motivated 
actors to build peace, the elite-level efforts of peace building completely adequate to 
building of sustainable peace (Lederach, 1997). According to Lederach, there are two 
opposing theories in the literature. One argues and suggests that peace can be built 
from the top-down while the other claims that it can be achieved from the bottom-up 
(Lederach, 1997). According to him, both insights are integrated and related. To 
demonstrate how they are integrated and related to one another, Lederach schematizes 
their relations as seen in the following graph. 
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Figure 2.2. Levels of Leadership (Source: John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: 
Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, 1997, pp.39) 
In brief, Lederach specifies three distinct levels of leadership: 1) Top-level 
leadership, 2) Middle-Range leadership, 3) Grassroots leadership (Lederach, 1997). 
Level-1 encompasses the key military and political leaders involved in the prolonged 
conflict. They can be the highest representative leaders of both sides and as such. 
Level-2 comprises the people in leadership positions as well. Although there are 
powerful contacts with top-level leaders of either government or the opposition group 
in this level, the leaders at Level-2 are not bound by the political ties. The ultimate 
function of these groups is to connect both the top and grassroots levels together and 
influence people across the human and physical geography of the ongoing conflict. 
The final group, Level-3 encompasses the large population, the grassroots of the 
society involved in conflict. War, conflict, and the mentality to survive are the most 
influential phenomena that shape the lives of members in the society (Lederach, 1997). 
Given this categorization, Lederach advances three peace-building approaches: 
top-down, middle-range, and bottom-up approaches. The first one, top-down 
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approaches, offers a well-issue-oriented short-term peace process that is managed by 
involved top-level leaders. The second, the middle-range approach, offers peace 
building from middle to out. This approach presumes that the achievement of peace 
lies with cultivating middle-range leaderships to a peace process. The third approach 
is defined as the Grassroots approach, or, bottom-up approach. As I mentioned above, 
the grassroots level encompasses the masses of ordinary citizens within a society. 
Despite the expanse of population at this level, the emergence of important practical 
efforts by this level is not entirely impossible. The peace processes in Somali, and 
Mozambique provide various instances as local peace conferences and programmatic 
peace efforts to peace builders (Lederach, 1997). 
I actually find Lederach’s approach very useful for analyzing any conflict 
because of his efforts to bind these two approaches. In Lederach’s view, the middle-
range level efforts have a significant role to reach a sustainable peace as middle-range 
efforts may provide a useful infrastructure within a society in order to reach sustainable 
peace. Lederach specifies three major different instances as their efforts: problem-
solving workshops, CR training, and the development of peace commissions 
(Lederach, 1997). These efforts can establish a relationship and skill-based ties among 
the society and top-level leaders. As it is understood from such types of activities, 
middle-range efforts focus on changing perceptions and establishing new networks to 
actors involved in the conflict.  
If there is a lack of middle-range efforts, grassroots leaders confront distinct 
challenges from those facing top-level, mainly because of the mentioned factor, the 
expanse of population. In the level of grassroots, although contacting the masses is 
easier than other levels, developing a comprehensive effort that entirely reaches the 
population is very difficult. In addition, any citizen at this level has various daily 
struggles with their basic human needs. Thus, these masses may view CAR efforts as 
an “unaffordable luxury” (Lederach, 1997). 
Actually, to determine how each of these peace approaches namely top-down, 
middle-range, and bottom-up to what extent contributes to the longevity or success of 
peace processes is a controversial issue of the literature on CAR. Debating and 
comparing all three levels are out of the scope of this research, however, as a matter 
of fact that the middle-range efforts can easily correlated with the concept of public 
peace process.  
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The public peace process approach claims the peace process consists of not 
only the diplomatic efforts applied by the elites of the primary parties involved in the 
conflict, but also the public efforts (Saunders, 1999). Saunders defines the concept of 
public process as following: “sustained action by citizens outside governments to 
change the fundamental relationship between groups in conflict.” (Saunders, et al., 
Chapter 3). This insight seeks to attach civil society and non-governmental 
organizations to peace processes in order to bring an alternative dimension to the 
official negotiations (Saunders, 1999, Gawerc, 2006). These efforts would develop 
alternative-innovative solution suggestions for the official negotiations but most 
importantly, these efforts would help the society to understand itself.   
As explained in the introduction, this thesis focuses on the public dimension of 
the peace processes and seeks to understand why Turkey needs a public peace process 
and what the main obstacles behind initiating a public peace process are. The next part 
provides a theoretical basis by concentrating on the social-psychological dimension of 
conflicts, particularly the ethos of conflict.   
2.4.  Socio-psychological Infrastructure 
Due the complexity and multi-dimensional characteristics of conflicts, 
explaining the mechanisms of resistance of both sides involved in the conflict to 
change requires a stronger model, in other words, a macro-social socio-psychological 
conceptual framework. All conflicts include socio-psychological factors that advance 
and mediate much of the behavior and attitude of societies (Kelman, 2007). Socio-
psychology focuses on the incompatibility of group identities and stresses the basis of 
collective fears that provide appropriate ground for violence (Stein, 2002). Analysts in 
the field evaluate the concept of conflict either partially or predominantly as a subject 
of social processes depending on the context of conflict (Fisher and Keashley, 1991). 
Although some socio-psychological changes can seem as temporary such as the 
emergence of anger and fear, some others as perceptions, attitudes, and goals of 
members of the society involved in conflict last long and these concepts lead to 
negative feelings and beliefs (Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Fisher and Keashley, 1991). 
In the literature of social psychology, the Bar-Tal’s model enables one to 
advance persuasive explanations of the mechanism of socio-psychological 
dimensions. The departure point of Bar-Tal’s theory presumes that socio-
psychological dynamics that elucidate the psyche of the members of the society evolve 
during a violent prolonged conflict, and they have a decisive impact on the 
 36 
 
development and continuation of the conflict. Hence, they make resolving conflicts 
extremely difficult (Bar-Tal, 2007). To explain the nature and content of socio-
psychological dynamics, he uses the concept of socio-psychological infrastructure 
(SPI) (See figure 2.3). 
To develop his model, Bar-Tal starts by defining the concept of intractable 
conflict, elaborating its own characteristics. Bar-Tal first uses four necessary features 
of intractable conflicts that are advanced by Kriesberg (1998). According to Kriesberg, 
to call a conflict intractable, it should be protracted, violent, it should perceived as 
irresolvable, and the parties involved in the conflict should make extensive investment 
(i.e. economic, military) to manage violent situations (Kriesberg, 1998). Bar-Tal 
affiliates three more specific features for intractable conflicts based on Kriesberg’s 
classification: intractable conflict should be perceived as zero sum in nature, should 
have a multifaceted nature, and should possess a central place in the society (Bar-Tal, 
2007). 
 Bar-Tal determines the three fundamental challenges of intractable conflicts 
that the society and individuals require meeting to adapt to its conditions (i.e. stress, 
loses, suffering, hardship, solidarity and so on). Respectively, these challenges are 
satisfaction of needs, coping with stress, and withstanding enemy (Bar-Tal, 2007). 
Satisfaction of needs as a concept refers to basic human needs that need to be 
fulfilled during intractable conflicts such as safety, positive identity, needs of knowing, 
and so on (Burton, 1990; Bar-Tal, 2007; Tajfel, 1982). The coping with stress concept 
refers to societies’ requirement of living in difficult conditions during conflict.  The 
concept of withstanding the enemy refers to challenges to maintain conflict on both a 
personal and societal level. The socio-psychological repertoire concept refers to 
eventually evolving the socio-psychological repertoire that consists of encompasses 
motivations, attitudes, emotions, and shared beliefs and that gradually transforms into 
a SPI. Since the SPI have a tremendous influence in intractable conflict, next, I will 
explain it at length, and analyze its functionality.   
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Figure 2.3. Conceptual Model of Socio-psychological Infrastructure (Source: Bar-
Tal, 2012) 
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The SPI in intractable conflicts encompasses three elements, which are in 
mutual interrelations: ethos of conflict, collective memory, and collective emotional 
orientation (Bar-Tal, 2007). Collective memory (CM) and EOC are shaped by widely 
shared societal beliefs, attitudes, and emotions - namely a socio-psychological 
repertoire. This repertoire is eventually advanced and institutionalized by the media, 
political and military leaders, schools, cultural products, and in the public sphere. 
While ethos of conflict refers to a narrative that explains the present, collective 
memory provides a clear narrative to give meaning to the past (Bar-Tal, 2013). 
According to Bar-Tal, collective memory has four significant functions: (1) 
Justification of the outbreak of the conflict, (2) providing a positive image of “us”, (3) 
de-legitimization of the opponent, and (4) presenting “us” as the victim of the opponent 
(Bar-Tal, 2003). On the other hand, the ethos of conflict has three crucial functions: 
(1) providing dominant orientation to whole society at present for the future, (2) 
determining the epistemic basis for social consciousness, (3) binding the society’s 
members together (Bar-Tal, 2007). Collective emotional orientation refers to the 
collective fear and hatred orientation of the society involved in intractable conflicts, 
which advance solidarity and affiliation within the society. Given all provided 
definitions, Bar-Tal’s (2007) ultimate claim is that without widely sharing ethos of 
conflict and collective memory, no society could meet the challenges of conflict 
specified above. 
With regards to SPI as a whole, there are five crucial functions of the socio-
psychological infrastructure that exists in a society: (1) presenting an epistemic 
background to enlighten to the conflict circumstance and fulfill the ideological 
background (ideological function) (2) justification of even violent or destructive in-
group acts toward the opponent, (3) sharpening inter-group differences to advance a 
sense of differentiation and superiority (social function), (4) preparing the society for 
violent and threaten conditions of life (psychological function), and (5) motivating and 
encouraging members of the society for mobilization, solidarity, and action (moral 
function). Bar-Tal notes that the first three functions chiefly work for the first 
challenge of satisfaction of needs, the fourth one responds to coping with stress, and 
the final function refers to both the challenge of satisfaction of needs and withstanding 
the enemy (Bar-Tal, 2007). 
This mechanism indicates that via the institutionalization of the socio-
psychological repertoire, the infrastructure becomes to work as a prism (Bar-Tal, 
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2007). By this mechanism, new information collected by the society members and new 
experiences start to be interpreted and construed in light of biased, limited, rigid, and 
hegemonic-shared beliefs. This model shows the shared repertoire of the parties 
involved in intractable conflict fuels perpetuation of the conflict and it becomes a 
component of a vicious cycle of the conflict. In this sense, theory asserts that due to 
the socio-psychological infrastructure, parties become more rigid and resistant to 
change, thus, it prevents de-escalation process of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). 
Having presented the general focus regarding the mechanism, the present 
research generally focuses on Bar-Tal’s theory, particularly the ethos of conflict 
phenomenon to understand the resistance in terms of contemporary narratives for the 
present and the future. The issues associated with collective memory, 
institutionalization of the repertoire, and relations between challenges and 
infrastructure are out of the scope of this research. Particularly, I would like to 
understand what are the main elements of ethos? How does Bar-Tal define the concept 
of shared beliefs? How can one define and limit it? What is the nature of it? The next 
part explores answers to such questions. 
2.5.  The Ethos of Conflict Theory 
In Bar-Tal’s definition, “the cluster of shared central beliefs that provide a 
unique, general, and dominant orientation to a society is called an ethos” (Bar-Tal, 
2000). Thus, the ethos of conflict has psychological impact on ongoing intractable 
conflict. It emerges, extends, and gains strength as a consequence of the experiences 
of the society during the conflict. It can be observed in leaders’ policies, school 
textbooks, public discourse, and cultural products (Bar-Tal, 2007).  
Actually the term of ethos was initially used by Max Weber while he was 
investigating the Western ethos and its implications on Protestant beliefs (Weber, 
1958). Then, the concept of ethos became used frequently in research (Bateson, 1958; 
Ossowska, 1973; Epstein, 1978). In the literature, two important debates over the 
concept of ethos have helped further research, offering a powerful basis to discuss: one 
is McClosky and Zaller’s inquiry of the American ethos (McClosky and Zaller, 1984), 
second is Bar-Tal’s work which should be evaluated as a first initiative to 
comprehensively defining the concept of ethos. Indeed, Bar-Tal’s theory perceives the 
concept of ethos in a broader way than others. 
Bar-Tal (2009) sees ethos as a major obstacle for peace building efforts. It 
prevents the de-escalation of the conflict and leads to its maintenance. Hence, it 
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induces unwillingness for peace processes and closeness to new positive information. 
I identify three central functions of ethos in Bar-Tal’s articles. First, the ethos works 
as an ideology to give individuals of society a comprehensive biased and selective 
worldview (Ross, 1995) to perceive the current chaotic “reality” of an ongoing 
intractable conflict, reasons for its outbreak, aims of conflict, and a path for the future 
(Bar-Tal, 2009). Second, the hegemonic consciousness, present and future goals are 
advanced by ethos through generating the justification and motivation for members to 
behave and act in good agreement with the social system (Bar-Tal, 2000). Third, ethos 
assists individuals within the society to meet the challenges mentioned in the former 
part of copping with stress and satisfaction of basic needs (Bar-Tal and Salomon, 
2006).  
Bal- Tar constitutes the concept of ethos of conflict upon these eight themes. 
Eight themes of ethos’s central societal beliefs respectively are beliefs of justness in 
own goals, of security, of de-legitimization of the opponent, of self-collective positive 
view, of self-victimhood, of patriotism, of unity, and of peace (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007, 
2009). In detail, the ethos of conflict consists of eight themes of shared beliefs as 
follows: 
1. Societal beliefs about the justness of the goals determine and explain the 
inter-groups’ goal in the conflict, importance of these goals, and rationales 
regarding them through delegitimizing the opponents’ goals. 
2. Societal beliefs about security refer to the evaluation of threats and dangers 
towards society, concerns related to both personal and collective security, 
and conditions in order to reach security. 
3. Societal beliefs that refer to a positive collective self-image reflect positive 
characteristics, values, patterns, self-esteem, and norms of in-group 
ethnocentric tendency to attribute such as heroism, fairness, bravery, and so 
on.  
4. Societal beliefs of in-group victimization refer to portraying the 
victimization of “us” by opponent. These shared beliefs address moral 
initiative to seek justice as well as mobilizing political, economic, and moral 
support from the international community.  
5. Societal beliefs that refer to delegitimizing the opponent reject and 
delegitimize humaneness of opponents. Thus, these shared beliefs illustrate 
in-group demands on exclusion of the opponents to outside. In addition, 
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these beliefs refer to the explanation of outbreak and the maintenance of the 
conflict. 
6. Societal beliefs of patriotism refer to emotional affiliation of the members 
of the society to the country by love, care, loyalty, and sacrifice to enhance 
social cohesiveness. 
7. Societal beliefs of unity refer to the significance of being united and 
propensity to disregard intra-state conflict in the face of external threats. 
These beliefs develop solidarity and belongings within the society and 
legitimize using the energy and forces of the society to cope with the enemy. 
8. Societal beliefs of peace refer to determining peace as an ultimate goal and 
desires, and the attitudes of the members of the society regarding peace.  
All of these societal beliefs constitute the whole structure and nature of the 
ethos of conflict and create a narrative regarding the ongoing intractable conflict that 
is shared by the members of the society (D. Bar-Tal and Salomon 2006). This ethos 
simultaneously leads to distortional and biased information delegitimizing the 
opponent as the victim of the conflict, and conversely, justifying the position of the 
group in conflict. Shared beliefs turn individuals’ prejudices and stereotypes regarding 
the “other” into a confident repertoire leading to resistance to change (Bar-Tal, 2013).   
As the literature illustrates, beliefs are formed by humans and their content do 
not have any limits. Beliefs are stored in humans’ minds and express their thoughts 
with regards to their religion, ideology, values, goals, expectations, and so on (Gordon, 
1990; Markus and Kitayama, 1994; Bar-Tal, 2000). Although they are implicitly 
protected in individuals’ minds, they are also expressed in distinct human products, 
namely films, paintings, newspapers etc. Many psychologists define belief in order to 
reflect a cognitive repertoire of human beings (e.g., Kruglanski, 1989; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975). Political scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists frequently analyze 
the concept of belief in their social and political theory such as Converse (1964), 
Dougherty (1985), and Merton (1957).  
Beliefs can possibly be differentiated into two types: personal and common or 
social. Bar-Tal defines societal beliefs as a “collective ideas shared by society 
members” (Bar-Tal, 2000). As it is understood from the societal and belief term, 
contents of societal beliefs represent common concerns and the social reality of the 
society associated with the societal life framework. Societal beliefs psychologically 
connects society members to their own society and it provides a unique lens to show 
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each members’ uniqueness and distinctness from members of other societies (Bar-Tal, 
2000). Thus, it can be claimed that societal beliefs are the most significant factors in 
order to form social identity. These definitions and explanations suggest that societal 
beliefs can have meaning solely on a social level because of their impact on the 
characterization of the society as a whole. So, the concept of societal beliefs should be 
perceived as a social phenomenon. Likewise, Kitayama and Markus claim shared 
beliefs are fundamental determinants of the development and formation of the 
collective orientation of a society (Kitayama and Markus, 1994). Can shared societal 
beliefs be changed? And, how can this change contribute to the resolution of conflict? 
Bar-Tal claims ethos is an enduring phenomenon but not unchangeable (Bar, Tal, 
2007).  
2.6.Conclusion 
This chapter provided the tools to develop the thesis’ theoretical insight and 
helped extract major conceptualizations of the study to research the ethos of the 
Kurdish conflict. In light of this background, the Kurdish question should seem as a 
consequence of a wide range of distinct interests, beliefs and perceptions, and today, 
it should be named as an intractable conflict. For many years, the conflict was shaped 
and based on several interest-based, fact-based, and value-based issues as mentioned 
in the Chapter Two. Although the armed conflict has revived today, the Kurdish 
conflict was in between the ceasefire and agreement stages according to escalation and 
de-escalation model while this research was being conducted, and including various 
collective memories and ethos contents based upon several decades.  
Before the peace process, I claim all but one of the preconditions existed, which 
is defined by Darby and MacGinty. As defined in the present chapter, they were “1) A 
willingness to address the key issues of conflict; 2) the end of violence; 3) prolonged 
agreement; 4) involvement of parties in process; and 5) conducting well intended 
negotiations (Darby and MacGinty, 2003, pp.2)”. Turkey could not reach the 
prolonged agreement. Actually, the revival of the conflict verified that I am on the 
right track. I am aware of that course there may be ups, downs, ends, and breaks in 
conflicts. However, I seek to say that Turkey could not publicized the peace process 
and the Turkish and Kurdish ethos of the conflict was one of the major obstacle in 
order to establish a public peace process. This inquiry attempts to provide a 
contribution to the trajectory of the Kurdish question by its inquiry regarding the 
Turkish ethos in the Thrace region.  
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In order to solve and research this issue, Chapter Two provided a solid 
background, which shapes the socio-psychological infrastructure. It defined the major-
minor parties, central issues of the conflict, and the peace initiatives and resolution 
strategies of the TSK and the Turkish state. There is no doubt all of these experiences 
had a tremendous impact on the collective memory and ethos of Turkish society. Next, 
I will proceed by explaining the scope, methodology, and limitations of the research. 
Later, in Chapter Five, I will present the analysis of the data I have acquired. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.   Scope of the Research  
As a case study, this thesis generally focuses on the Kurdish question, 
particularly on the peace process. The shared beliefs of local opinion leaders (LOLs) 
regarding the peace process in Turkey have been evaluated. I was particularly 
interested in the description of the public discourse within the Turkish society. Even 
though this point of departure provides a momentary aspect associated with attitudes 
and perceptions towards the Kurds, it is important to note that this data has high 
potential to have impact on new generations to come, additionally the discourse of 
formal social channels in the future.  
In order to explore the socio-psychological repertoire of the non-Kurdish 
society, I conducted field research in indirect periphery zones of the Kurdish conflict. 
Researching in indirect periphery zones may provide pure approaches, which are 
affected by mass media and education. The institutions and cultural products of a 
society not only form and shape shared beliefs, but also contribute to the maintenance 
of shared beliefs (Bar-Tal, 2007). On the other hand, although citizens in indirect zones 
may not be affected directly by the uprisings, armed conflicts, and high levels of 
violence, there are various indirect influence points such as economic and 
psychological ones on their lives due to the ongoing-armed conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013).  
Naturally, the interviews from indirect periphery zones may not represent the 
views of the whole Turkish society, however, specific patterns discovered in the data 
tells something regarding the trajectories of psychological and political positions and 
the relative social exclusion of the Kurdish identity. On the other hand, the discourse 
of reconciliation may be more apparent in these zones. It is most possible that citizens 
in indirect zones may consider armed conflict as a thing of the past while citizens of 
direct zones may think it will occur in the future again. Periphery zone citizens’ 
perception of suffering – although suffering is a subjective concept – may be lower 
than citizens in direct zones. Therefore, their perception of victimhood may be lower 
than that of citizens in direct zones.  
The determination of the shared beliefs of the LOLs in periphery zones is 
important data for the literature. If the actors and peace- builders of the peace process 
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cannot transform unwillingness to willingness even in periphery zones, how do they 
achieve sustainable peace in the southeast region, which has more intense concerns 
close to discussing peaceful issues and has experience with high level of violence?  
In order to narrow the scope of the field research, I focus on the Thrace region, 
especially the LOLs in Tekirdağ. I limit my research by selecting Thrace as a region, 
because it is the furthermost region to the eastern part of Turkey in terms of distance, 
culture, and perception of religion. On the other hand, there are two other reasons I 
chose Tekirdağ in the Thrace region. First, it is the most representative metropolitan 
city of Thrace, according to Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). 
Second, it is the most ideologically plural city in the region.  
Finally, it should be noted here that this research was constructed before July 
2015. As stated, the Kurdish attacks and the Turkish state’s counterattacks have 
restarted as a consequence of the heinous attack on July 20th (See Chapter Two). In 
the analysis of the thesis, the reviving of the conflict and the end of the ceasefire has 
not been taken into the consideration. 
3.2.  Methodology of the Research  
This study is designed as a qualitative study based on fieldwork conducted in 
Tekirdağ from June 1st to June 30th 2015, and draws on 20 in-depth interviews 
conducted in Turkish (See Creswell’s (2014) work on Research Design: Qualitative, 
Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches). Determining and choosing 
participants for the research was relatively challenging for several reasons. Due to easy 
access and the aim of the research (focusing on the middle-range efforts), I target the 
civil society activists (7), businessmen (2), journalists (3), a government official (1), 
politicians (2), and NGO representatives (5). Much of my decision making on 
considering a sample that best represents the diverse stakeholders in the region was 
guided by the kind recommendations given to me by local researchers involved in 
working in the Thrace region, namely Tekirdağ branch of the MUSIAD (Müstakil 
Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association), Trakya Gazetesi (Regional media firm), and my father Erdoğan Orhan, 
a thirty-year businessman and politician in Tekirdağ. 
The research reached a representative sample size for the region. All of the 
participants were the representatives at high positions in NGOs, religious 
organizations, business world, and political camps that are influential on the Turkish 
society’s mindset. While half of the participants were defining them as secular, the 
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other half of them was religious people. The other measurement to choose my sample 
is to reach different political camps. Therefore, the sample included at least three 
participants from the each political camps, respectively nationalists, conservatives, 
republicans, and others. The final determinant measurement to select participants was 
the socio-economic and occupational variety of the participants.  Their age ranges 
between 45 and 87. 2 women and 18 men have been interviewed, without paying 
attention to the gender of the respondents. With respect to the education level of the 
respondents, the majority of the participants (12) stated that they have graduated from 
university. While 5 of the respondents reported that they have graduated from high 
school, 3 of the respondents reported to have completed a master’s degree. 17 of the 
interviewees had visited the eastern side of Turkey such as Diyarbakir, Hakkari, 
Mardin, and Bitlis for either tourism or business. Except for one of the interviewees, 
all have Kurdish friends in their social life. No one has a Kurdish member in his or her 
family. As far as the worldview of the participants, 8 of the interviewees can be defined 
as secular persons, while the other 12 are conservatives. All interviews have been 
conducted at the respondents’ own offices and each of them was conducted in a quite 
setting. The participants were extremely friendly and the mood of each session was 
very casual and positive.  
Interview questions were pilot tested with two university students and two 
regular people. My interview consisted of 16 questions (See Appendix A) conducted 
with the people who define themselves as Turkish. One to one and 30-minutes 
interviews have been conducted with the participants. The questions in the interviews 
were specifically designed to explore the shared beliefs of the target groups on issues 
such as the peace process and the Kurdish question. The interviews addressed the 
personal beliefs of interviewees, paying special attention to angles of their Turkish 
political identity. During my field research, I had also the chance to meet and conduct 
off-the-record talks with many people from various backgrounds. However, in 
Tekirdağ, I encountered some difficulties. For instance, although four of the 
participants had accepted to have an interview with me before seeing the questions, 
after confronting the questions they rejected to proceed with the interview, because of 
some uneasiness regarding the topic, namely the Kurdish question.  
Throughout my research, I make use of primary and secondary sources. 
Primary sources have been obtained via in-depth interviews. As the second method of 
the research was researching the literature related to public peace process and conflict 
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resolution theories. The secondary sources were reviewed via library research, 
academic journals and books regarding the Kurdish question’s history. The secondary 
sources also include the reports from institutions such as Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum 
Araştırmaları Vakfı (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, SETA), 
Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Foundation for Economic and Social 
Research of Turkey, TESEV), Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Wise 
Men Center for Strategic Studies, BILGESAM), and KONDA Research and 
Consultancy in Turkey. To advance a solid background, I defined who the major and 
minor parties are, what the context of the conflict is, what the core issues of the conflict 
and the peace initiatives during the last thirty years (See Chapter 2).  
Finally, I would like to note these methods of research have the capacity to 
accommodate me to reach knowledge in two dimensions. The in-depth interview 
method was useful for me to collect detailed information about persons’ repertoire and 
behavior associated with the Kurdish question. On the other hand, the literature search 
was determinative on conducting the hypothesis and central assumptions of the 
research. 
3.3.  Limitations of the Research  
One should consider that this research has limitations when it comes to the 
interpretations of findings. The first limitation of the research is the size and selection 
of the sample. There were fewer women than men, and the sample was limited to 
Tekirdağ in the Thrace region. The research might have been strengthened by choosing 
a sample that was more representative of the population in the Trakya region. Rather, 
the scope of the research was limited by periphery cities for the conflict. The research 
may also have been conducted in direct zones (i.e. Diyarbakır, Ağrı, Tunceli) and 
semi-direct zones (i.e. İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara), and the findings may have been 
compared. Time and funding limitations were the most important obstacles towards 
doing so.  
The second limitation was age. The age range of the participants was between 
45 and 87, due to my limitation in reaching local opinion leaders. The shared beliefs 
and the EOC of younger people may have been different from those of my participants. 
Third, my participants were highly educated. I had only five respondents that reported 
they graduated only from high school. To observe widely shared beliefs, the sample 
might have had a more inclusive population without college degrees.  
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The third limitation was size of the scope. The size of the research may not 
have been strongly representative of to what extent the general Turkish society has a 
shared EOC or as to what type of distinct contents the Turkish society has. Thus, this 
may have made it difficult to generalize the results of the research. Even so, the size 
of the present study can be considered significant, as it is by nature a qualitative 
research.  
Analysis of large amounts of information in terms of eight themes of the EOC 
may have also been problematic. Additionally, participants might not have shared all 
their beliefs and emotions about the peace process and the Kurdish identity. It is still a 
sensitive issue in Turkey. It has political dimensions as well as security concerns for 
the people. Some people may not have felt free to share their own ideas openly, 
because of political concerns.  
Nevertheless, the findings of the research on the EOC of Turkish citizens 
provide strong similarities, and indications regarding the EOC, even without having a 
representative sample for all the Turkish citizens in Turkey. In my view, the findings 
of the research were important and they may create a path for future researchers in this 
area. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyzes and discusses the findings of the research. Chapter one 
was organized to indicate what the complex dimensions of the Kurdish question are, 
what the peace initiatives to the conflict are, and at what level the Kurdish question is 
today. In this chapter, I demonstrate how these developments have shaped the Turkish 
society’s shared beliefs. I will show how the Turkish society perceive and simplify the 
conflict by which repertoire. In addition, I seek to explain how the socio-psychological 
infrastructure implicitly works within the society. This chapter seeks to answer the 
main research questions pointed out earlier: ““How does the society respond to the 
peace process? What is the impact of ethos on responses? Is the Turkish society 
resistant to change? If yes, why? If not, why?”   
4.2.Findings 
This part demonstrates the contents of collective memory (CM), which defines 
the main cause of the outbreak of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2003, 2007, 2013). In addition, 
it analyzes the each of the eight-shared beliefs of Turkish ethos. Respectively, shared 
beliefs about the justness of Turkish goals (TG), de-legitimization of the Kurdish goals 
(KG), security, positive collective self-image and image of the Kurds, in-group 
victimization, patriotism, unity, and peace. 
4.2.1. Collective Memory (CM) 
The socio-psychological infrastructure of the society is constructed through 
EOC and CM (Bar-Tal, 2013). Additionally; the narratives of TEOC are supported by 
the CM, which is widely shared by the society (Bar-Tal, 2002). In my research, I 
determined three general top-categories shaping the CM. They were external 
explanations, internal explanations, and avoidance of the question. (See Table 4.1.) 
The first category sees external/foreign powers or strategies of them regarding 
the Turkish state as a central cause of the Kurdish conflict. Hence, according to first 
category, the question is artificially created by the powers that have interest in the 
region. In detail, to support such claim, it is asserted that there are numerous foreign 
spies in the southeastern region of Turkey coordinated by foreign powers that deeply 
know the region’s geography and sociology. 
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Table 4.1. Content of the Collective Memory  
Categories Explanations 
External 
Foreign powers and their strategies are the main cause of the 
Kurdish conflict 
Internal 
Inattention of the rulers, irreligiousness, not to keep promises 
in the past, ignorance, regional interest groups, and late wave 
of nationalism. 
Rejection  Rejection of the Kurdishness of the conflict 
These foreign powers desire to prevent the development of Turkey because of 
its high importance regarding its geo-political position. The following interview may 
revealed this pattern: 
Türkiye gelişmesin diye planlanmış şeyler bunlar. Kürtlerin, en saf, 
temiz olanları ile konuştuğun zaman, hiçbir zaman savaştan yana 
düşünmezler. Buradaki asıl mesele, dış güçlerin desteği. İçeriden 
olmayan bir şeyler var. (N.A., media owner, NGO representative)1 
The second category sees internal factors as the fundamental cause of the 
Kurdish conflict. Therefore, according to this category, the Kurdish question should 
be understood by the internal sociological, psychological, economic, political, and 
even religious dynamics. The first reason in this category was the inattention of the 
rulers. 
Bu meselenin içerideki yöneticilerimizin gafletinden kaynaklanan bir 
yanı var, bir de dışarıdakilerin bu gafletten istifade edip meseleyi bir 
merkeze oturtma gayreti var, ve muvaffak oldular. (B.M. NGO 
representative) 2 
In this view, the inattention of the rulers of the past slighted the educational, 
economical, and developmental issues for the region. On the other hand, as one can 
see in the interviewee’s explanation above, this approach sees the inattention of the 
rulers as a facilitatior factor for the foreign powers. Some interviewees see the 
irreligiousness, not to keep promises in the past, ignorance, and even regional interest 
groups (as feodal structure of the region) other facilitator dynamics caused the Kurdish 
conflict.   
                                                 
1 These things are planned so that Turkey does not advance. When you talk with pure and innocent 
Kurds, you see that they are never pro-war. The real issue here is the support of foreign powers, 
something that is not from inside. 
2 On the one hand, this matter has arisen due to the negligence of our rulers and on the other hand, 
foreign powers have taken advantage of this negligence and they have been successful. 
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Yani, jandarma baskısı sadece doğuda yok, bu bölgede de var. Bu 
bölgedeki halk isyan etmiyor. Orada yabancı güçlerin oynaması var ve 
İslamı da bilmiyorlar açıkçası. Malesef. Cehalet var. ( R.U., doctor, 
executive)3 
The last perceived internal factor was observed as late wave of nationalism. 
This ideological perception conceives of the conflict as the mobilization of the Kurdish 
people by the nationalism thoughts of their elite.  
Demem o ki, Kürtlerin milliyetçilik ateşi, biz de mesela, 1920’lerde 
yanmışsa, Kürtlerde 70li yıllarda yakıldı. Geç bir milliyetçilikle karşı 
karşıyayız. Asıl tetikleyen geç milliyetçilik. (M.D., teacher, NGO 
representative)4 
The third category completely rejects the existence of the Kurdish conflict. I 
mean they rejected the Kurdishness of the conflict. While the first side of this category 
claims that through the decades we live with the Kurdish people in peace in our society, 
the other extremist approach totally rejects the existence of the Kurdish identity.   
Kürt arkadaşım, ahbabım oldu. Ne onların, ne bizim sıkıntımız olmadı. 
Bu ayrıca aleviler içinde geçerli. Böyle bir şey, son yıllarda yaratıldı. 
Ben eskiden emin olun bilmiyordum bile bunların Kürt olduğunu. 
(M.K., politician, businessman)5 
    
Kürtler, Türkmen aşiretidir zaten.. Kürtlükle alakaları yok. (M.S., 
intellectual, journalist)6 
    
Şahsım adıma, Kürt meselesi diye bir sorun yok. Kürtlerle ilgili bir 
sorun, bana göre olmaması da gerekir. Yaratılıyor bu sorun. (L.C., 
businessman and NGO representative)7 
The third category completely rejects the existence of the Kurdish conflict. I 
mean, they rejected the Kurdishness of the conflict. While the first side of this category 
claims that through the decades we live with rhe Kurdish people with peace in our 
society, the other extremist approach totally rejects the existence of the Kurdish 
identity.   
                                                 
3 So, the pressue of the gendarme is not a factor only in the East but also in this region (the West). The 
people in this region (the West) do not riot. However  foreign powers have a role to play in the East. 
Frankly, they do not know Islam. Unfortunately, there is also the ignorance of the people in the East. 
4 That is to say, the fire of Turkish nationalism was ignited in the 1920s, however, the fire of Kurdish 
nationalism was only recently lit in the 1970s. What we are facing is a belated nationalism. This is the 
principal trigger. 
5 I have had Kurdish buddies. There was never any trouble between us. This also goes for the Alevis. 
Such a thing has been created only in recent years. You can be sure that  I did not even know that my 
friends were Kurdish. 
6 In reality,  Kurds are from Turkmen tribes. They have nothing to do with Kurdishness. 
7 If you ask me there is no Kurdish question. And there shouldn’t be any problems. This is a problem 
that is being created. 
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As mentioned earlier, all of these three categorical perceptions shape the CM. 
This collective memory has been developed through the years to understand the causes 
of the outbreak of the Kurdish conflict within the Turkish society in peripheral zones. 
And they were shaped via the experiences mentioned in chapter one.   
4.2.2. Shared Beliefs about the Justness of the TG and De-legitimization 
of the KG 
Turkish citizens’ shared beliefs about the justness of goals generally derive 
from nationalist insight (See Table 4.2.) For the justness of Turkish states’ goals, 
indivisible territorial integrity is the common concept that is emphasized by almost all 
participants. The goal of securing territorial integrity seems to be an indisputable 
justification of counterterrorism operations.  
All participants without any exceptions consider this territorial goal of Turkey 
is under attack by the PKK, accordingly foreign powers. The common phrase in the 
participants’ discourse regarding the issue can be briefly summarized in the following 
answer:  
Kürtler benim atalarım kanlarını döktüğü toprakları istiyorlar. Neden 
onlara bağışlayalım ki bu toprakları? Ordu dediğin nedir kardeşim? 
Ordu orada ülkenin toprak bütünlüğünü korumak için vardır! E yani 
terroristler sivilleri öldürecek de, asker onlara saldırmayacak mı? 
Savaştan  bahsediyoruz, şakası yok bunun! (N.A., media owner, NGO 
representative)8 
Another interviewee justifies the attacks of the Turkish army as: 
Türkiye’nin güneydoğusunda bir çatışma olduğunu kabul etmeliyiz. 
Eee, çatışmalarda duygu, bilim, değer aranmaz... (B.I., retired müfti, 
merchant)9 
As for the de-legitimization of the Kurdish goals, victimization was the central 
concept of the interviews. In the interviews, none of the participants accept any 
suffering of victimization of the Kurdish identity due to various reasons. There were 
six types of categories in terms of victimization understandings. The first category 
thinks they cannot even discuss the legitimization of the Kurdish goals, because of the 
intention of Kurdish demands, or martyrs, or the Turkish State’s democratic and 
economic developments. 
                                                 
8 Kurds want the land where my ancestors shed their blood. Why should we give these lands to them? 
What is the use of an army, my brother? The army is there to protect the territorial integrity of the 
country. Terrorists kill civillians and soldiers should not attack them? This is a war we are talking about 
it is not a joke! 
9 We must accept that there is a conflict in the southeast of Turkey. And in a conflict, feeling, science, 
and values are of little importance. 
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Table 4.2. Legitimization of the TG and De-Legitimization of the KG 
Categories Explanations 
    
1) Legitimization of the 
TG 
  
  Indivisible territorial integrity 
  Securing territorial integrity 
2) Deligitimization of the 
KG (Victimization) 
  
   2.1.) We cannot discuss 
the victimization 
Intention of Kurdish people, martyrs, the Turkish 
state's economic and democratic developments 
  2.2) Victimization on one 
side, lack of victimization 
on the other side 
Kurdish language rights, rejection of the Kurdish 
identity, victimization was in the past - not today, 
regional victimization - not the victimization of 
the Kurdish people  
  2.3) There is 
victimization. The Kurdish 
people are the cause of the 
victimization. 
Feodal structure, preventer activities of the 
Kurdish people, rebellions. 
3) Deligitimization of the 
KG (Attitudes of the 
Turkish State) 
  
   3.1) We should separate 
the past and the present 
Some officials were guilty - not the Turkish state, 
relatively misrecognition in the past, 
   3.2) The Turkish state has 
never been a discriminator 
Democratic-Ideological-Economic rigths of the 
Kurdish people, requirements of centralization 
process, security policies 
The first group points out the intention and the martyrs as:  
Kürtlerin ne istediğine de bakmamız lazım. Kürtler ne talep ediyor? 
Yani, ben, önümüze bir şey kondu şimdi bizim, Kürdistan, bağımsız 
kürdistan. Böyle bir niyet taşıyan kürt hareketi, nasıl bir mağduriyetle 
işe başlayacak TR’de? Vali olamıyorum, ekonomist olamıyorum, esnaf 
olamıyorum, okuyamıyorum, kürt oluşum bana engel mi diyor? Yoksa, 
bu söylemleri, Kürdistan devletinin kurulmasına giden yolda bahaneler 
olarak mı karşımıza çıkıyor? (H.E., journalist, NGO representative)10 
  
Orada o kadar şehit var... Ne mağduriyeti tartışacağım?  (N.S., 
pharmacist, NGO representative)11 
                                                 
10 We need to look at what the Kurds want. What are the Kurds demanding? The demand for an 
independent Kurdistan is before us. How would a Kurdish movement with such intentions make their 
claims of victimhood? Do they say that I cannot be the governor, I cannot be an economist, or I cannot 
trade because I am a Kurd? Or, does such discourse emerge as an excuse on the way to the establishment 
of a Kurdish state? 
11 There are so many martyrs there...What victimhood are we talking about? 
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The second group in this category thinks discussing the legitimization of the 
Kurdish goals today is meaningless due to the Turkish State’s economic developments 
over the region and democratic developments over the country.  
Ben Kürtlerin mağdur olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Kesinlikle 
düşünmüyorum. Ben Doğuya sıklıkla gittiğim için buradaki insanları 
biliyorum. Burası yep yeni bir şehir haline gelmişse, demek ki 
ayrımcılık diye bir şey söz konusu değil. O zaman nasıl bir ayrımcılık 
var? (L.C., businessman and NGO representative)12 
 
Yani, ben mağduriyete katılmıyorum. Çünkü, demokratik haklarını 
istedikleri gibi kullanıyorlar. Bir, ben son olaylara kadar şu Türktür bu 
Kürttür diye hiç düşünmedim. Erzincan’da öğretmenlik yaptım, %30u 
Kürttü öğrencilerimin. Hala ilişkilerim sürüyor. Sonra bir çocuklardan 
bir kısmı genel müdürdü Ankara’da. Bir kısmı milletvekiliydi. Yani, 
toplumun içindeler, bir aradayız. (O.D., industrialist, intellectual)13 
The third group in this category claims there are several classes or groups 
victimized in the past in Turkey. Therefore, the victimization argumentation cannot be 
used as claim in order to legitimize the Kurdish goals.  
Valla, benim kadar mağdur edilmemişlerdir. Madem öyleyse, ben 
onlardan çok mağdur edildim. Ben katılıyorum onlara, ama, bunu bir 
silah olarak kullanmalarına karşıyım.  (B.M. NGO representative) 14 
The second category de-legitimizes the KG by both relatively accepting and 
rejecting the victimization claims of the Kurdish people. The first group in this 
category accepts the victimization of the Kurdish society in terms of the laws in 
Kurdish language usage in the past and the rejection of the Kurdish identity.  
Bir bakıma Kürtlerin mağdur olduğunu, bir bakıma olmadıklarını 
düşünüyorum. Kürtlerden bu ülkede Cumhurbaşkanı bile çıktı. Ondan 
dolayı fazla olmadıklarını düşünüyorum. Ama bir bakıma da, onların 
mağdur olduklarını düşünüyorum. Çünkü şöyle bir şey söyleniyor: 
“Efendim, Kürt yoktur, Türk vardır. Karda yürürken kart-kurt derken 
Kürt olmuş. Böyle bir ırk meydana gelmiş”. Ben bu tezi kabul 
etmiyorum. (B.I., retired müfti, merchant)15 
                                                 
12 I do not think that the Kurds are victims. I most certainly do not. I know the people there because I 
often go to the East. If these places have become brand new cities, it means that there is no 
discrimination. So what is this discrimination we are talking about? 
13 Actually, I do not agree that there has been any victimization because they can use their democratic 
rights as they wish. I never even considered that he is a Kurd or she is a Turk until these recent events. 
I taught in Erzincan where %30 of my students were Kurdish. We still keep in contact. Now, some of 
them are general managers in Ankara and some of them are deputies in the TBMM. So, they are a part 
of the community. We are all together. 
14 Well, they have not been as much a victim as me. If so, I have been more victimized than them. I 
agree with them, but I am opposed to them using victimization as a weapon. 
15 In some ways I think that the Kurds have been victimized, and in some ways I think not. There was 
even a Kurdish president in this country. This is why I do not think that they have been victims. But, in 
a way, they have been victims because people say something like this: “There are no Kurds, only Turks. 
The name ‘Kurd’ came from the sounds of “kart-kurt” Turkish people in the mountains made when they 
walked in the snow I do not accept this theory.  
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Bu kardeşlerde en azından, dil konusunda, çok baskı yapıldığı bir 
gerçek yani. Ama bu baskının belki şiddeti, on üzerinden ikidir. Hiç 
konuşamıyorlar da değil yani. (M.U., pharmacist, religious organization 
representative)16 
The second group in this category rejects the partial victimization in a different 
way. According to this group, although we should accept the victimization of the 
Kurdish people in the past, today, it is difficult to advocate the victimization of the 
Kurdish people.   
 Kürtlerin mağduriyetiyle olarak da, zamana, zemine ve şartlara bağlı 
olarak söylemek mümkündür. Özellikle, sosyal ve ekonomik açıdan bir 
mağduriyet yaşadılar. Çünkü, son yıllara kadar, gözle görülür bir 
şekilde yatırımların, yeten iş yerlerin fabrikaların, tesislerin, gerek 
sanayi gerek turistik açıdan kürtlerin yaşadığı bölgelerde çok 
görülmediği bir vakadır. (F.A., teacher, bureaucrat) 17 
The third group in this category separates victimization from Kurdishness. 
From this view, on the one hand, it is a reality that the southeast region relatively more 
victimized region than other regions of Turkey. On the other hand, we should know 
that southeast region could not be stated completely as a Kurdish region.  
 Valla, Kürtler mi demek lazım, bölge mi demek lazım. Ben buna Kürt 
olarak değinmem burada yaşayan Kürt vatandaşımız da vardı, ihmal 
edilmemiştir. Ama bazı yerde, bölge ihmal edildiyse, orada tabi Kürt de 
vardır, Türk de vardır, Çerkez de vardır. Bana göre, bölgeler ihmal 
edildi dersek daha doğru olur. (M.K., politician, businessman)18 
The last category acknowledges the victimization of the Kurdish society. 
However, for them, the main cause was not the Turkish state, rather, some other 
internal factors should be seem as main causes of this victimization. For instance, the 
following interviewee sees the social structure as a main cause for this victimization:  
 Mesele Türklük kürtlük değil. Orada, güney doğunun şu anki sosyal 
yapısı mağdur ediyor, problem üretiyor. Ağalık, efendim, kültürel aşiret 
yapısı.. (M.D., teacher, NGO representative)19 
                                                 
16 It is a fact that there has been a lot of pressure put on the Kurds in regards to their language. But the 
intensity of this pressure was maybe two out of ten. It’s not like they can’t speak Kurdish at all. 
17 It is possible to speak of the victimization of the Kurds in regards to time, background, and 
circumstances. In particular, they experienced victimization in social and economic terms because it is 
a fact that until recent years, investments, businesses, and factories were not visibly seen much in the 
Kurdish regions. 
18 Well, should we be talking about victimization of the Kurds or victimization of the region? I do not 
consider the issue a Kurdish issue because there were Kurdish citizens in our region (West) and they 
have not been victimized. But, in some places, if a region was ignored, of course there were Kurds, 
Turks, or Circassians there. If you ask me, it would be more accurate to say that the regions have been 
neglected. 
19 The problem is not about being Turkish or Kurdish. The current social structure of the south-eastern 
region aggrieves and produces problems such as the rule of aghas, tribal structures...etc 
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The second group in this category sees the Kurdish people’s preventer activities 
in the region as the main cause for victimization. From this view, the people in the 
region have always prevented the development initiatives of the Turkish state. 
 Hiç mağdur edilmediler. Ben, tüccarım. Düşünün, fabrika 
kuruyorsunuz, Kömür işletmesi kuruyorsunuz, bombalıyorlar. E 
kabahat kimin, TC’nin mi? Elektriği bedava kullanıyor, beş kuruş para 
vermiyor, gene isyan ediyor. Bu nasıl mağduriyet? (M.S., intellectual, 
journalist)20 
The third group in this category perceives the Kurdish rebellions as the main 
cause of victimization.  
 Tabi ki Kürtler şundan mağdurlar, bir ordu var. Ordu ne? Türkiyenin 
bölünmez bütünlüğünü sağlamak için orada. E canım, onlar bu 
katliamları yaparken, orduda onlardan birçok insanı öldürüyor. Yani, 
savaş bu... Şakası yok bunun... Tabi ki ortada onlar da zarar görüyor. 
(N.A., media owner, NGO representative)21 
Another question regarding the de-legitimization issue was: “How do you 
evaluate the relationship between the Turkish state and Kurdish citizens?” This 
question tried to observe how the interviewees evaluate the Turkish state’s attitudes 
over the Kurdish society. Without exception, all of the participants legitimize the 
Turkish State’s attitudes over the Kurdish society as legitimate. However, in details, 
answers to this question were twofold.  
The first category separates policies of the past and the present. Today, 
relationship between the Turkish state and the Kurdish citizens indicates no 
discriminatory character. One side of this category sees few officials responsible for 
illegitimate activities in the region.  
Şimdi, devlet dediğinizde... Böyle resmi bir şey yok, yani Kürtçülüğü 
baskılamak adına, Kürtleri sindirmek adına. O bölgeyle alakalı hususi 
TC devletinin bir baskısı yok. Ama devleti oluşturan mekanizmaların 
içerisinde, sevk ve idare ile memur  kesim diyelim, mesela, yıllarca o 
bölgeyle alakalı muazzam suistimaller yaptılar. (A.C., businessman, 
religious organization representative)22 
                                                 
20 They have never been victimized. I am a merchant. Imagine, you are setting up your factory, or a coal 
business, and they bomb it. Well, who is to blame? The Turkish state? They have free access to 
electricity, yet they do not pay a penny... But they are still rebelling. How is this a victimization? 
21 Of course the Kurds are victims - there is an army. What is an army? The army is there to ensure the 
indivisible integrity of Turkey. Well, they are carrying out all these massacres, so the army is killing a 
lot of their people. So, this is war... It is no joke! So, of course some people are going to suffer from 
this situation. 
22 There is no official pressure on behalf of the government suppressing the Kurds. Also there is no 
particular pressure by the Turkish state in that region. However, some administration officers within the 
state mechanism did cause some tremendous abuse for years in that region. 
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 The other side of this category accepts some of the illegitimate activities in the 
past. And, these groups see the misrecognition as the main reason. 
Yani, yaratılışlarından kaynaklanan özelliğin, devlet tarafından 
yeterince anlaşılmadığını düşünüyorum. Sosyal dokuda farklı. 
Dolayısıyla, iki vechesi var. Kürtlerin, müstakil bir devlet 
düşmanlığından bahsetmek, dediğim gibi, yeterince tanımamaktır. Ama 
devleti idare eden insanların, yöredeki insanların hassasiyetlerini çoğu 
zaman tanımamasından kaynaklanan elbette bir çatışma vardı. (F.A., 
teacher, bureaucrat) 23 
The second category of the participants directly emphasized the non-
discriminatory character of relationships between the Turkish state and the Kurdish 
citizens and rejected the claims of discrimination of the Turkish state. The first group 
rejected the claim by mentioning the democratic, economic, and ideological rights of 
the Kurdish society. 
Devlet katiyen ayrım yapmadı. Yapsaydı, AKP’de bu kadar Kürt 
milletvekili olur muydu? Süleyman Demirel’in idaresinde o kadar ağa 
çocuğu milletvekili olur muydu? Cumhuriyet döneminde o kadar Kürt 
olur muydu? (M.S., intellectual, journalist)24 
 
 Şu anda, Adana’dan, 48 geçit diye bir tabela gördüm... Nedir bu? Çayı 
arabanın üstüne koy, dökülmeden gidersin. Dağı delmişler, viyadükler 
yapmışlar... Şimdi bu hizmet kime kardeşim? Ben böyle rahatlık 
görmedim.  Bu yol boyutu.. Ben bazı hasteneler gördüm, dedim ki 
burası üniversite mi? Bu insanlar bunu hak ediyor mu? Evet. Bunlara 
bu hizmet gitmiş mi? Evet. (L.C., businessman and NGO 
representative) 25 
 
Şimdiye kadar hiç ayrımcılığa şahit olmadım. Yani, Kürtler, TR’nin 
kesinlikle bir parçası olarak görülüyor. Kesinlikle azınlık olarak da 
görülmüyor. (R.U., doctor, executive) 26 
                                                 
23 I think the natural characteristics of the Kurds have not been sufficiently understood by the Turkish 
State. The social fabric is also different. Hence, there are two aspects. Firstly, to mention hostility 
towards the state by the Kurds, as I said, means that we do not know them well enough. But, secondly, 
there was a conflict that arose due to State officials’ not recognizing the sensitivities of the people of 
the region. 
 
24 There was never any discrimination by the State. If there was then, how do you account for such a 
high number of Kurdish deputies in the AK Party? Could there have been so many children of aghas in 
the Suleyman Demirel administration? Could there have been so many Kurds in the administration 
during the Republican period? 
25 I saw a sign showing 48 viaducts in Adana. What is that? Now you can load your tea on top of your 
car, and drive without it falling off. They’ve dug out the mountain, they’ve made viaducts. Tell me 
brother who was all of this for? I myself have never seen such comfort. This is the transportation aspect 
of the issue. I’ve seen some hospitals that look like universities. Do these people deserve all of this? 
Yes. Have these services been provided for these people? Yes. 
26 I’ve never come across any discrimination. So the Kurds are definitely considered a part of Turkey. 
And they are definitely not a minority. 
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The last group undoubtedly rejected the claims of discrimination by 
legitimizing the armed struggle of the TSK. According to this group, the Turkish state 
did what should have been done. On one side, the Turkish state must be centralized, 
on the other side; the Turkish state should secure the country.  
Sert davrandı tabii ki. Çünkü Osmanlı merkezileşmeye başlıyor. Tabi, 
eskiden orada ağa falan, dediği dedikti. Yol yapayım diyor, yol yapılırsa 
diyor jandarma gelecek, o da merkezi hükümetin kontrolü demek, yolu 
istemiyor. Okul istemiyor. Eskisi gibi devam etsin istiyor. 500-1000 
senelik sosyal yapının değişme sancıları bunlar. Yoksa, Kürt olduğu 
için değil bu şiddet, direnç olduğu için. Direnç nerede? Yol yaptırmıyor, 
okul yaptırmıyor. Kimlik değil problem. (M.D., teacher, NGO 
representative)27 
 
Biz yıllarca beraber yaşadık. Ben şuna inanıyorum ki, bir asker, bir 
Kürtü öldürürken, bir düşmanı öldürüyor gibi bakmıyor. Ama mecbur, 
o sıkınca, asker de sıkıyor. (N.A., media owner, NGO representative)28 
To sum up, there is consensus on legitimization of the TG and the de-
legitimization of KG. In the research, I observed that indivisible territorial integrity 
and securing it was the most fundamental argument for legitimizing TG. As for de-
legitimization of the KG, Turkish society conducts an argumentation by rejecting the 
victimization and discrimination claims.  
4.2.3. Shared Beliefs about Security 
As to another enduring and widely shared belief is about the security of the 
state, during my research, I observed the Turkish society is concerned about its 
territorial security. In addition, it is not only a security concern but also focal anxiety 
(See Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3. Shared Beliefs about Security 
Problem Factor of the Threat 
Territorial Integrity The PKK as a subcontractor organization of foreign powers 
National Security The PKK as a secret organization of the Kurds from abroad 
                                                 
27 The State was tough, of course. Because the Ottomans have begun to centralize. Of course, before the 
agha used to rule the roost. The State said “Let me  build roads”, but the aghas said  “If roads are built, 
the gendarme will come. And that would mean control of the region by the State. So, they did not want 
any roads or schools in the region. They wanted to keep the social structure the same. These are the 
pains of transformation of the social structure of 500-1000 years. So the violence has not been againt 
the Kurds for their Kurdishness, but rather because of their resistance. What kind of resistence? 
Resistance to the building of roads and schools. So, the problem is not about identity. 
28 We have lived together for years. I believe that a soldier does not think he is killing the enemy when 
he kills a Kurd. But, the soldier is forced to kill. When the Kurd shoots, the soldier shoots. 
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Allah korusun bu işin sonunda bir ayrılık olur korkusu dahi var. Çünkü, 
o topraklara gözünü diken çok adam var. Bunu herkes biliyor. Gizli 
saklı da değil zaten. (M.U., pharmacist, religious organization 
representative)29 
 
Dış güçler, gerek ekonomik, gerek siyasi, gerekse Türkiyenin bölünmez 
bütünlüğünü parçalamak istiyorlar... Çünkü ortadoğu’da Türkiye, güçlü 
bir yapıya sahip. Etrafımıza baktığında, bütün hepsi bize karşı, 
donatılmış. İran bile. (N.A., media owner, NGO representative)30 
One can easily realize this preoccupation in the discourse of the narratives. 
Without exception, all of the participants mentioned the national security threat as a 
fundamental part of their security. 
Dün bu coğrafyayı paralayan, parçalayan ama bu gün hala bu ülke 
üzerinde programları olan ülkelerin hiçbir zaman ellerini ve eteklerini 
bu ülkeden çekmediklerini gördüm. (A.C., businessman, religious 
organization representative) 31  
Based on these common security shared beliefs, almost all participants 
perceived a threat from the PKK on their territorial integrity. So, when they were asked 
about the perception regarding the PKK organization, all of the interviewees defined 
the PKK organization in the sense of external roots. The external organization 
perception was twofold. The first group defined the PKK as an organization, which 
was built by the Kurds from abroad.  
Onlar, Kürt devletlerini kuracaklar. Zaten kurdular... Tescil 
ettirecekler... Topraklarını genişletiyorlar şimdi.. PYD, PKK, Hepsi 
Barzani’ye bağlı. (M.S., intellectual, journalist)32 
  
TR’de, devletin de çeteleri yok mu kendi içinde? Var. Onların da 
çeteleri PKK, bu kadar. Bu da Kürtlerin kurmuş olduğu bir güvenlik 
teşkilatı. Türkiye dışındaki Kürtlerin kurduğu bir yapı. (M.S., 
intellectual, journalist) 33 
The second group defined the PKK organization as a subcontractor 
organization of foreign powers, even Armenians, which threatens Turkish security in 
terms of political, military, and economic threats.  
                                                 
29 God forbid, there is a fear of separation in the end. Because there are many who covet that land. 
Everyone knows this. It is not a secret.  
30 External forces want to tear down the economics, politics and the indivisible integrity of Turkey. 
Because, Turkey is a powerful structure in the Middle East. When we look around us, we see that they 
are all against us. Even Iran. 
31 I see that those countries who have torn this geography up in the past have never in fact abandoned 
Turkey and they still have their own plans for Turkey. 
32 They will establish a Kurdish state. They’ve already done so.They just need to have it officially 
recognised.They are expanding their territory now. The PYD and the PKK are all connected to Barzani. 
33 Are there no gangs in the Turkish State? Yes, there are. The PKK are their gangs. This is a security 
organisation established by the Kurds. It was established by the Kurds who live outside of Turkey.  
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PKK, bence, daha üst akıllardan destek alıyor. Kandil orada olduğu 
sürece, APO ile anlaşmak, HDP ile anlaşmak sorunu çözmeyecektir. 
Kandilde, dünya küresel güçlerin kontrolünde, etkisinde. Kandil şu 
anda revaçta, büyük bir pazarlığın aktörü. (M.D., teacher, NGO 
representative)34 
 
Ben bu PKK’nın, ASALA’nın devamı olan, kökünün de belki 
ermenilere dayanan bir teşkilat olduğunu düşünüyorum. Kökü içeride 
değil. İyi niyetli Kürtlerin, çözüm ortağı olmak için üretilmiş bir örgüt 
değildir. (L.C., businessman and NGO representative)35 
To sum up, whether the organization of foreign powers or the Kurds abroad, 
the participants think there are various enemies who want to destroy Turkey’s potential 
high level economic growth and territorial integrity. 
4.2.4. Shared Beliefs about a Positive Collective Self-Image and Image 
of the Opponent 
Collective self-images and images of the opponent are very important to 
understand to what extent ethnocentrism is accepted within the Turkish society. The 
positive self-image repertoire provides some clues to observe the level of self-praise, 
self-glorification, and self-justification (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005). Among the 
interviewees, one groups thinks it is impossible to differentiate Turks from Kurds in 
terms of characteristics based on the same geography, culture, and inter-marriages. 
The other group advocates separation the characteristics of two ethnic identities 
because of either nationality or education. For this group, self-images of the Turks and 
images of the Kurds are observed as follows (See, Table 4.4.).   
Self-Image 
When the participants were asked what the main characteristics that 
differentiate Turks from Kurds are, they stated as follows: fair, possessed tradition of 
governance, educated, nationalist, tolerant, and individualist. As negative self-images: 
crafty, jealous, and envy were stated. 
Images of the Kurds 
Although I asked what the positive characteristics of the Kurds are, some of 
the participants stated merely negative stereotypes regarding the Kurds, some of the 
participants shared both negative and positive images of the Kurds together, and others 
                                                 
34 The PKK, I think, receives support from higher minds. As long as Kandil remains, negotiating with 
Abdullah Ocalan or HDP will not solve the problem. Kandil itself is under the control of global powers. 
Kandil is currently in great demand and is an actor in a major bargaining process. 
35 I think the PKK is a continuation of ASALA, and is an organisation whose roots may go back to the 
Armenians. The roots of it are not internal. It is not an organization established by well-intentioned 
Kurds to be partners in the solution. 
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merely remarked positive stereotypes of the Kurds. Positive stereotypes of the Kurds 
were stated in terms of the following characteristics: hospitable, respectful, emotional, 
in-group solidarity, faithful, brave, knowing their history, sincere, amiable, having 
delicious foods. Conversely, for negative stereotypes: getting mixed up in wrong 
businesses, vindictiveness, complex of inferiority, less anger control, ignorance, self-
seeking, unreliability, and evil-disposition were determined. Even one participant said: 
“Hiçbir iyi özelliği yok onların! (N.S., pharmacist, NGO representative) 36” 
Table 4.4. Shared Beliefs about Images 
Self-Image 
Positive: Fair, possessed tradition of governance, 
educated, nationalist, tolerant, and individualist 
Negative: crafty, jealous, and envy 
Separation Impossible 
It is impossible to separate characteristics of the Kurds 
from the Turks. 
Image of the Kurds 
Positive: hospitable, respectful, emotional, in-group 
solidarity, faithful, brave, knowing their history, 
sincere, amiable, having delicious foods. 
Negative: Getting mixed up in wrong businesses, 
vindictive, complex of inferiority, less anger control, 
ignorant, loser, self-seeker, unreliable, evil-disposed 
The second question to observe negative images of the Kurds was as to why 
Kurds resorted to violence. The findings demonstrate that there are two categories of 
approach according to this problematic: external and internal explanations. (See Table 
4.5.) I should mention although I allusively asked the question by saying “the Kurds”, 
only two of the opponents felt the need of separating the PKK from the Kurdish 
identity (I will analyze this issue further in the next part of this chapter).  
Table 4.5. Causes of the Violence of the Kurds 
External Explanations Internal Explanations 
Incitement of the foreign power 
Economic and Educational Problems 
The PKK's ideology 
Violence as a language, methodology 
                                                 
36 They have no good qualities! 
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
Incitement of the foreign power 
Genetic and cultural nature of the Kurds 
Action-Reaction Mechanism 
The first category was the external explanations; this group explained the 
violence of the Kurds in terms of the incitement of the foreign powers. 
Bu bölgeyi teröre boğacaksak, bu bölgeden terörle kazanç elde 
edeceksek bu grup kim olmalı dediler. Bu bölgede en uygun grup 
Kürtler. Bu yumuşak karın, o kadar ilginçki, üç büyük kavmin de 
yumuşak karnı. İran, Irak ve TR... (H.E., journalist, NGO 
representative)37 
The second category explained the violence through five different aspects. The 
first group in this category sees the economic and educational problems as a cause of 
violence. The second group perceives the violence as a result of the Kurds’ ideology. 
Sebep ideolojik aslında. Kürtlerin, şiddeti besleyen en önemli 
organizasyonu PKK. Daha öncesinde öyle çok şiddet yoktu. PKK, 
Kürdistan İşçi Partisi. Sosyalist bir harekettir, sosyalist hareketin 
temelinde de daima şiddet vardır.  (M.D., teacher, NGO 
representative)38 
The third group tends to understand the violence phenomenon as a language or 
a methodology to achieve social goals. Therefore, these groups perceive the violence 
preference of the Kurdish people as a language to attracting notice. 
İsteğini, düşüncelerini, mecliste bulamadıkları için... Şiddet, kötü bir 
dil. Türkiyeye bunun faturası çok oldu. Ya evet, şiddet onlara göre bir 
yöntemdi belki ama, hiçbir ülkenin, insanın kabul edemeyeceği bir 
yöntemdi. (M.K., politician, businessman) 39 
The fourth group linked this preference to the genetic or cultural nature of the 
Kurds. 
İnsanlar, yaşadıkları coğrafadan etkilenirler.Dolayısıyla, sahil 
bölgelerde yaşayan insanların mizacına sirayet eden meltem dokunuşu 
ile, yalçın kayalıkların ve ekonomik zahmetlerin yaşandığı bir zeminde 
yaşayan insanların yaratılışında bir farklılık olması, adeta tabiidir. 
(F.A., teacher, bureaucrat) 40 
                                                 
37 They said if we are going to drown this region in terror, if we are going to reap profit from terrorism 
in this region, then which group would be the most suitable for us? The most suitable group is the Kurds 
in this region. The Kurds are the soft belly for three countries: Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. 
38 For ideological reasons, actually. The PKK is the most important organization of the Kurds that feeds 
the violence. There was never so much violence before. The PKK, the Kurdish Workers Party is a 
socialist movement. And violence has always been the basis of socialist movements.  
39 Because their demands were not met in the parliament. Violence is an ill form of communication. 
Terrorism has costs Turkey dearly. Yeah, maybe to them violence was a method, but it is a method that 
is unacceptable in any country.  
40 People are affected by their geography. Hence, there is a difference in the temperament of people who 
live in coastal regions and people who live amongst a background of economic troubles, it is completely 
natural. 
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The fifth group evaluated the issue due to the wrong policies of the Turkish 
state, as an action and reaction mechanism.  
Şimdi, tepki-anti tepki olayı var ortada. Doğuda ve güneydoğuda, 
imkansızlıklar içinde boğuşan bir takım kesimler var. Ama, yine o 
bölgelerde, güllük gülistanlık içinde yaşayanlarımız da var, ağa, şeyh 
gibi. Bunlar, o insanları yönetir konumdalar. Bazı siyasiler, geçmişte, 
çıkarları için şiddete başvurdular. (T.Y., retired politician, 
businessman) 41 
4.2.5. Shared Beliefs about In-Group Victimization 
While the TEOC encompasses the self-image of the Turks as fair, able to 
govern, educated, and so on, it also encompasses a collective self-image of Turkey as 
a victim. (See, Table 4.6.) As a consequence of the Kurdish conflict, Turkish citizens 
perceive themselves as victims of the conflict. I could say the victimization was the 
leading theme throughout my interviews. By nature, the Turkish citizens in periphery 
zones mostly perceive the victimization in terms of indirect psychological and 
economic factors. 
At the individual level, some participants stated there is no detrimental effect 
of the Kurdish conflict on them.  
Yani, kendimi bildim bileli, meselenin mesele olduğunu, bakın bir 
mesele yok demiyorum, bu meselenin bir mesele olduğunu, bilerek, 
yaşamışım ama, çok da etkilediğini söyleyemem. (F.A., teacher, 
bureaucrat) 42 
However, all other participants think they have been impacted by the conflict 
in terms of psychological, economic, and sociological factors. Economic factors points 
out to expenditures made and the economic future of the Turkish state.  
Memleketimizin maddiyatı için üzülüyorum. Oraya harcanan milyon 
dolarlar beni çıldırtıyor. (M.U., pharmacist, religious organization 
representative) 43 
 
Kürt meselesi var, ve ben bundan doğrudan etkileniyorum birey olarak, 
vatandaş olarak. Ekonomik açıdan, sosyal açıdan...Gidip gönül 
rızasıyla gönlünce gezemiyorsun, geçmişini tanıyamıyorsun.. Diğer 
                                                 
41 Now here ise a response-reaction. There are some sectors struggling with several impossibilities in 
the East and South-east. But again, in that area, there  are some people living on a bed of roses such as 
the aghas and sheikhs. They are managing the people here. Some politicians, sheikhs and aghas, in the 
past, have resorted to violence for their own interests. 
42 So, ever since I can remember – I am not saying there is no Kurdish issue – I have lived with knowing 
that there is such a thing called the Kurdish issue. But, I cannot say it has affected me that much. 
43 I feel sorry for the economy of our country. Having to spend millions of dollars over there drives me 
crazy.  
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taraftan bölgeler arası adaletle ilgili sıkıntılar... Ben elektrik ödüyorum 
onlar ödemiyor. (C.G., businessman, NGO representative) 44 
Few of the participants think they are psychologically victimized due to 
Kurdish immigration to the Thrace, and by the martyrs. 
Çok endişeliyim. Bunu babam söyledi zaten. 30 sene sonra Tekirdağ’da 
rahat rahat dükkanınızda oturamayacak, çarşıda gezemeyeceksiniz 
dedi. Tekirdağ, çok göç aldı. Ben düşünemiyorum, bir şalvarlının 
olabileceğini hiç düşünemezdim ben. Ve buraya kaç senede geldik biz? 
30 senede. (N.S., pharmacist, NGO representative)45 
 
Kim ister oğlunun ölmesini.. Buradaki anne oğlunu askere gönderdiği 
zaman, uyku uyuyamıyordu. En çok psikolojik olarak etkilendi. (N.C., 
media owner, NGO representative) 46 
Table 4.6. Shared Beliefs about in-group Victimization 
Individual Social 
No detrimental Effect No Detrimental Effect 
Psychological (martyrs) 
Psychological (hatred, paranoia, 
hostility, hate, and animosity, anxiety 
for the future) 
Economic (Expenditures) 
Relational (To become severe, not to act 
naturally) 
Social (immigration, security)   
As for the societal level, there were three types of response category. The first 
category again rejected any social detrimental effect. Rather, it helps people 
understand the truth. 
Şimdi, etkilenme diye bir şey yok. Herkes yolunda gidiyor. Bilakis, 
hakikati öğrendiler. Yani, Kürtlerin Türkiyeyi parçalamak emelleri 
hakkında bilgileri oldu. (M.S., intellectual, journalist) 47 
                                                 
44 There is a Kurdish issue, and I am personally and directly affected by it, both economically and 
socially. You are not able to travel to these regions freely, you are not able to learn about your past. On 
the other hand, there are some problems with inter-regional justice. I pay for my electricity but they do 
not. 
45 I am very worried. My dad told us that in 30 years we would not be able to sit comfortably in our 
shops or walk in the city in Tekirdağ. Tekirdağ allowed so many immigrants in. I would never have 
thought that I would see a person wearing baggy trousers in Tekirdağ. And all this after how many 
years? 30 years. 
46 Who would want their son to die? Whenever a mother sent her son to the military, she could not sleep. 
We were mostly affected psychologically. 
47 First of all, there has not been any influence. Everyone is going on his way. Now they have learned 
the truth. I mean, they were informed of the Kurds’ ambitions to divide Turkey.  
 65 
 
The second category emphasizes that the Turkish society developed several 
attitudes due to the outcomes of the victimization of the Kurdish conflict. According 
to this group of participants, hostility, hate, paranoia, and animosity of the Kurds and 
fear increased within the Turkish society.   
Tabi, medyanın şeyleriyle etkilendi. Paranoya gelişti. Her akşam şehit 
cenazeleri haberleri, toplumu baya bir gerdi. (R.U., doctor, executive)48 
 
Toplum etkilenmez mi? Adam çocuğunu gönderiyor, askerlik yapsın 
diye, şehit olarak geri dönüyor. En çok psikolojik olarak etkiledi. (N.A., 
media owner, NGO representative) 49 
 
Toplum çok etkileniyor, hatta, Allah korusun bu işin sonunda bir ayrılık 
olurmu korkusu dahi var. (M.U., pharmacist, religious organization 
representative) 50 
 
Ülkenin geleceği açısından kaygılanırım. Eğer bu meseleyi biz 
çözemezsek  TC vatandaşları olarak, birileri çözer bunu bir gün. Bu 
ülkenin insanları birbirinden koparlar, Allah korusun bu ülkenin başına 
çok kötü şeyler gelir. (T.B., businessman, politician) 51 
The third category outlined that the Kurdish conflict damaged the relationship 
between the Turkish society and the Kurdish society. To become severe, not to act 
naturally, disagreements among the Turkish society were the most important 
arguments of this category. First group in this category, define the victimization of the 
Kurdish conflict through its impact on the relations among the Turkish people.  
Toplum etkileniyor. Mesela, benim en rahatsız olduğum konu, “ben 
Kürdüm diyor, adama zorla mı Türk dedirteceğiz, onlar da insan”” 
falan..Yani, bir Kürt beni ikna etmesi lazımken, Türk beni Kürtler 
lehine ikna etmeye çalışıyor. (H.E., journalist, NGO representative) 52 
The second group in this category pointed out becoming severe and not acting 
naturally.  
Madde planında da mana planında da. Sertleşme hızla, İstanbula geldi, 
Adanayada geldi, Antalyaya, İzmire de geldi. Türk olmayan toplumda 
                                                 
48 Of course, the people were affected by the media. Paranoia developed. Every evening news of the 
funerals of the martrys, has made the community pretty nervous. 
49 How can society not be affected? A man sends his child to complete his military service and he returns 
as a martyr. Society has been psychologically affected, more than anything else. 
50 Society has been greatly affected. God forbid there is even the fear of separation. 
51 I am anxious for the future of the country. If we do not solve this problem as Turkish citizens, others 
will solve it for us. Then the people of this country will break away from each other. God forbid, terrible 
things could happen to this country. 
52 Society is affected. For instance, what bothers me the most are conversations like this:  “A man says: 
I am Kurd. We can’t make him a Turk. They are also human beings...” etc. I mean, Kurds should be the 
ones convincing me, but we have Turks who are trying to convince me in favor of the Kurds. 
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çok etkilendi. Sertleştik birbirimize karşı. (A.C., businessman, religious 
organization representative) 53 
 
Şüphesiz, bir kere, doğal davranamıyorsunuz. Mesela siz bir Kürt’le iş 
yapacaksınız. “”Ya kürtlerle ortaklık yapılır mı? Kürtlerle evlenilir mi? 
Yola çıkılır mı, bilmiyormusunuz onlar kürt”” dendiğini varsayalım. 
Sizin için, şahsınız için problem olmazsa bile, dolaylı yönden elbette 
bir etkilenme söz konusudur. (F.A., teacher, bureaucrat) 54 
4.2.6. Shared Beliefs about Patriotism 
All interviewees emphasized their patriotic emotions and attitudes in their 
discourses. Nourishing loyalty and love, sacrifice, fighting for Turkey, and the national 
collective were encouraged by all of the participants. For them, all soldiers are actively 
engaged in the conflict and casualties are revered. For the sake of the goals of the state, 
the majority of the participants stated they were ready to give up their individual needs, 
and desires to defend their territorial integrity. Instances of such shared beliefs about 
patriotism can be observed in the following quotes from the participants’ answers:  
Her aileden bir şehit cenazesi geldi.. Şu anda.. Her bölgeden var... Ama 
buradaki insan diyor ki “ben ülkemi savunmak için gittim” diyor. Öl 
dediler, öldüm. Veya benim oğlum, vatana feda olsun diye gönderdim 
diyor kalan ailesi de...  (M.D., teacher, NGO representative) 55 
 
Ülke bütünlüğü açısından daha dikkatli yürütülmeli.. Bir takım adımlar 
atıldığı zaman, karşı adımları planlamak gerekir. Bazı adımlar ileriye 
yönelik fayda getiriyor mu diye dikkat etmek gerekir. (O.A., 
businessman, religious organization representative ) 56 
4.2.7. Shared Beliefs about Unity 
There were three central questions in order to observe shared beliefs about 
unity; respectively, education in the mother tongue (Kurdish language), the self-
government of the region, and the unity of the society. (See Table 4.7.)  
                                                 
53 The effect has been both material and spiritual. Violence came to Istanbul very quickly. It also came 
to Adana, Antalya, and İzmir. The non-Turkish community was also very affected. We have become 
harsh towards one another. 
54 You definitely cannot behave naturally. For example, let’s say you want to do business with a Kurd. 
And let’s assume that someone says: How can you think of forming a partnership with a Kurd? Or how 
could you marry a Kurd? Do you not know that they are Kurds...” etc. Although it is not a problem for 
you, would be influenced indirectly. 
55 Every family in the region has had one member martyred. But the person from here says “I went to 
defend my country. They said “Die!” and I died.”. Or, his family says “I sent my son to be sacrificed 
for the sake of the motherland”. 
56 The process should be executed with caution for the integrity of the country. While the State takes 
one step forward, it should also prepare for the opposite plans. Some steps should be evaluated to see 
whether they bring benefits or not. 
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In terms of the demand for an independent Kurdistan, all of the participants 
evaluated this issue as the central threat of the Kurdish conflict and evaluate the 
demand of the self-government of the region as a separatist demand.  
Konuştuğum çoğu kimse, alın doğuyu dediğim zaman yine hayır diyor. 
Ben yine senin himayende kalacağım diyor. Yönetim bende olacak 
diyor. Böyle saçmalık olur mu? Ben sana parayı vericem sen keyfini 
süreceksin olmaz öyle şey.  (R.C., media owner) 57 
As for the education in the mother tongue, there were three categories. The first 
category completely rejects this demand as they think this permission may lead to other 
language demands in Turkey. Therefore, it may break the unity of the society.  
Ben onu kendi adıma doğru bulmuyorum. Çerkez başka bir şey 
söyleyecek, laz başka bir şey söyleyecek, Kürt başka söyleyecek. Ne 
olacak? Nereye gidecek bu.. (C.G., businessman, NGO representative) 
58 
 
Table 4.7. Shared Beliefs about Unity 
Education in Mother-
Tongue 
Self-Governance 
Unity of Society 
(Marriage) 
Impossible (may break 
unity) 
Impossible Possible 
Learning OK, Education 
impossible 
Separatist demand Possible, but suspicious 
Possible   
Impossible, not 
applicable 
Main Ties Binding the Turks and the Kurds 
Interests, Republican government, common ideals, business, geography, inter-
marriages, history, culture + tradition, religion 
The second category was more moderate. According to this category, although 
it is not possible to accept the Kurdish language as a national language, there is no 
problem to culturally learn the Kurdish language. However, there were three different 
argumentations rejecting the national education dimension. The first group in this 
category claimed it is too late to establish a Kurdish science language; therefore, it will 
damage the future of Turkey. 
Ana dilde, rahat, özgürce konuşulabilsin, hiç kompleks yaşamasın, 
basın, yayın, teşvik edilmeli, bu baskının, psikoljik manada, mutlaka 
                                                 
57 Most people I talk to say no when I say take the East. They say I will remain under your protection 
but I will be in control. What nonsense  is this? I will give you money so you can do whatever you 
want? That will not happen! 
58 Personally I do not think it is right. Circassians will say something different, the Laz people will say 
something different, Kurds will say something different? So what then? Where will this debate go? 
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izale edilmesi lazım. Ama, anadilde eğitim açısından aynı noktada 
değilim. Bir devletin, bir milletin, bir toplumun, müşterek dili olması 
gerekiyor. Okullar nezdinde, sizin bir dille yaptığınız eğitim, aynı 
zamanda dünya bilimiyle de yarışabilmeli. (F.A., teacher, bureaucrat)59 
The second group in this category pointed out to the inadequacy of the Kurdish 
language to be a national language. Rather, they defined the Kurdish language as a 
clan language. 
Biz milli bir dil kabul etmemiz lazım devlet olarak. Yani, bir kabile dili, 
milli dil haline gelebilir mi? Gelemez. Hiç sıcak bakmıyorum bu talebe. 
Ama, her dil, bir kişi dahi konuşan kalsa, çok büyük bir kültür 
hazinesidir. Çingenece bile olsa, her dil hazinedir. Bütün unsurlarıyla, 
ağız, diyalektik yapılarıyla, her şeyiyle tespit edilmeli, kayda 
geçirilmeli, mümkünse geliştirilmeli. Bunun önü açılmalı. Kürtçe de 
konuşulsun ve müsade edilsin. Ama eğitim, milli dille olmalı. (H.E., 
journalist, NGO representative) 60 
The third group in this category evaluates the demand of education in Kurdish 
mother tongue as a potential separatist demand. However, as a moderate, they make a 
distinction between education and training.  
Şimdi, ana dili öğrenme ile ana dilde eğitim farklı olaylar. Ana dilde 
öğrenme, anasından öğrendiği dilin gramerini öğrenme, onunla ilgili 
kitap okuyabilme konusu. Ana dilde eğitim ise, okul öncesinden 
başlayarak, üniversiteye kadar kendi dilinde eğitim yapmak.. Anadil 
öğretilmeli. Ama eğitim bizim için tam bir açmazdır, ve yanlış 
olacaktır. Ayrılık sebebi olacaktır. PKK eskiden Kürt devleti istiyordu, 
şu anda diyor ki, hayır ben ayrılmak istemiyorum diyor, tabi taktik 
olarak. Ama diyor tek istediğim, ana dilde eğitim. Çünkü, artık dünya 
konjonktüründe kısa dönemde ayrılamayacağını anladı. (M.D., teacher, 
NGO representative) 61 
                                                 
59 Kurds should be allowed to speak their mother-tongue freely without having a complex. The media, 
press, and publication should also be encouraged. The pressure on language should be eliminated in the 
psychological sense. But, when it comes to education I do not have the same view. A state, a nation, a 
society, a community should have a common language. In a school, the education which is carried out 
in a particular language should be able to compete with knowledge from all over the world. 
60 As a state, we need to accept one national language. Can the language of a tribe become the national 
language? No. I do not look favourably upon such a demand. However, every language, even if there is 
only one person left who speaks it, is a huge cultural treasure. Even if it is Romany, each language is a 
treasure. Every language should be identified, recorded, and if possible, enhanced with all its elements, 
dialects and dialectical structures. Kurdish  should also be spoken. But education must be provided in 
the national language. 
61 First, learning one’s mother-tongue and education in the mother-tongue are two different events. 
Learning one’s mother-tongue consists of learning the grammar of the mother tongue and gaining the 
ability to read in the mother-tongue. But, education in the mother-tongue starts from pre-school all the 
way to university. The mother-tongue should be taught. But education in the mother-tongue is a 
dilemma for us, and it is wrong. It would be a cause of separation. The PKK wanted to establish a 
Kurdish state in the past. Currently, it says no, I do not want to separate, all I want is to be educated in 
my mother-tongue. Because they realised that separation is not going to be possible any time soon in 
the current state of the world. 
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The third category was the most optimistic side. From their view, there is no 
obstacle to establish education in the Kurdish language. For them, the Ottoman 
Empire’s experiences provide a valid example to acknowledge this. 
Ana dilde eğitim alabilmeli, devlete Kürtçe dilekçe verebilmeli. Orada 
bir de Kürt memuru bulunabilmeli. (B.I., retired müfti, merchant) 62 
Bence bir sıkıntı yok. Osmanlının yapmış olduğu sistem gayet 
mükemmel. Dinini de diline de karışmayacaksın. Bu zaten vardı. Bu 
inancımız. (O.A., businessman, religious organization representative) 63 
Last, to understand their perception regarding the unity of society, the 
participants were asked how they would consider a marriage of a member of their 
family to a Kurdish person, and what the main ties binding the Turks and the Kurds 
together are (See, Table 4.7). 
There were again three categories of answers about permission for marriages. 
The first category was open and moderate to give their children permission to marry a 
Kurdish person. Few of the participants already had Kurdish daughter-in-laws and/or 
son-in-laws.  
Şimdi, yani Kürt insan da bir vatandaş, insan nihayetinde. Etnik olarak 
Kürt olması çok şey değil bana göre. Ama tarz olarak, bizim 
standartlarımızdaysa, fikir, dünya, yani zırcahil değilse, insansa, 
işindeyse, neden olmasın? Önemsemem. (C.G., businessman, NGO 
representative) 64 
Gayet normal, olabilir. İngilizle evleniyorda, Amerikalıyla evleniyorda, 
Kürt benim vatandaşım, niye olmasın. Ailemde değil ama yakın 
dostlarımda var evlenen. (O.D., industrialist, intellectual) 65 
The second category said although they would not try to prevent this marriage, 
they might be uncomfortable because of this marriage. In other words, they would 
have reservations regarding such marriage. 
Gönül işi bir defa... Kürt olduğu için kötü insandır girişiminde 
bulunamayız. Ama, daha sonra, aile olarak karşımıza neler çıkacağını 
bildiğim için, uyarıcı olurum, sakıncalarını söylerim, bu dönemde, iyi 
olmadığını, sıkıntı getireceğini söylerim. Çünkü, farklılıklar artık orta 
yere çıktı. Çıkıyor.  (H.E., journalist, NGO representative) 66 
                                                 
62 One should be able to be educated in their mother-tongue, and should be able to submit a Kurdish 
petition to the state. A Kurdish officer should be available for them there. 
63 It is not a problem for me. The system of the Ottoman Empire was quite perfect: “You will not 
interfere in other peoples’ religions or language”. This was the case. This is our belief. 
64 Well, a Kurdish person is also a citizen of Turkey and a human being. Whether he is ethnically 
Kurdish or not is not a problem for me. In terms of manner, if he or she is in line with our standards, in 
terms of ideas, worldview, and he or she is not ignorant, why not? It’s not an issue for me. 
65 It is perfectly normal. If people can marry an English person or an American then why shouldn’t they 
be able to marry a Kurd The Kurds are our fellow citizens. No one in my family has married a Kurd but 
some of my close friends have. 
66 This is a matter of the heart... We cannot say that someone is bad just because they are Kurdish. But 
because I can foresee the consequences we will face as a family I would caution and warn of the 
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Ben sesimi çıkarmam, ama içimden evet demem. Adetim öyledir 
benim, ama içim OK vermez. Çünkü orada 30.000 tane şehit var. (N.S.) 
67 
The third category evaluates such marriage impossible or unacceptable. 
Interviewees in this category mentioned several times that they do not want to speak 
like politicians about this important issue.  
Vallahi bunda siyaset yapamayacağım, kesinlikle vermem, istemem. 
(L.C., businessman, NGO representative) 68 
 
İslami açıdan uygun bakmıyorum. İslamda küfüv var. Bunun içinde 
kültürel denklik de var. Kültürel denklik olmazsa, uyumsuzluk olur. 
Kültürel denklik olmadığı için, muhakkak sıkıntılar olacaktır. (O.A., 
businessman, religious organization representative) 69 
 
Şimdi, bir siyasetçi olsa, ya olur falan derim, ama, şu bir gerçek ki, bu 
günkü şartlarda öyle bir evliliği tasvip etmek istemem açıkçası. Neden? 
Kardeşim, illa, toplumda bir şey çıkar. “Gitti bilmemneyin kızını aldı 
da, burada kız mı yok!” Öteki de diyecek ki, burada erkek mi yoktu da 
gitti kızını Kürt’e verdi. Şimdi genç birisi gitti, şehit oldu diyelim. Ben, 
Kürt’e kızımı vermiş biri olursam, o cenazeye nasıl giderim. Adam 
tükürür benim yüzüme orada. (N.A., media owner, NGO 
representative) 70 
4.2.8. Shared Beliefs about Peace 
Shared beliefs about peace were observed by asking three questions to 
interviewees. The first one is as to how they define the concept of peace. The 
perception of peace is presented in both negative and positive ways of understanding 
(Table 4.8.). The second question demonstrates what the participants think about the 
ongoing peace process (See Table 4.9). The perceptions regarding the ongoing peace 
process were threefold: positives, doubtful participants, and negatives. 
 
 
                                                 
problems. I would say that now is not a good time to marry a Kurd because of the trouble it will cause. 
The differences have now become and are beoming clear and apparent. 
67 I would not object, but inside I would not approve of it. This is how I am. Because there are 30.000 
martyrs there. 
68 Well, I will not try to be politically correct here. I most certainly would not give my permission for 
such a marriage. I definitely would not want such a thing. 
69 I do not consider it appropriate from an Islamic perspective. There is the concept of “kufuv” (partner 
compatibility) in Islam. There should be a cultural match also. If there is no cultural match, there will 
be incompatibility. Due to the lack of cultural compatability, there will certainly be trouble. 
70 Now, if I were talking to a politician, I would say that it would be okay. But frankly in today’s 
circumstances, I would not approve of such a marriage. Why? Because there will inevitably be someone 
in the community who will gossip. One will say, “Look! He married a Kurdish girl! Weren’t there any 
Turkish girls for him to marry?”. Another will say, “Couldn’t she find a Turkish boy? Why did he give 
his daughter to a Kurdish boy?” Suppose that a young man from Tekirdağ was martyred. If I had allowed 
my daughter to marry a Kurdish boy, then how could I go to this funeral? They would spit in my face. 
 71 
 
Table 4.8. Definitions of the Peace Concept 
Negative Definitions Positive Definitions 
The lack of war Equality/Justice/Freedom 
The lack of terror Democracy 
The lack of discrimination Common national ideals 
The lack of fear Good intention / Thinking in positive way 
To be able to endure for war Love of Humanity  
Impossible to reach Living Islam 
  Tranquility / Happiness 
The positive side presented various argumentations for the peace process. The 
first group on this side thinks the Turkish state understood the impossibility of ending 
the conflict by violence. 
Bölgede bir kürt devlet istendiğini biliyoruz. TC devleti, ve onu 
yönetenler bunu aslında biliyorlardı ve görüyorlardı. Bir yere kadar 
onunla oynamak istediler. Önceden, döverek yaparız diyorduk, şimdi 
yapamayacağız dedik artık, anlaşarak o bölgeyi korumamız 
gerekiyordu, bu kabul etmemiz gereken bir gerçek. (A.C., businessman, 
religios organization representative) 71 
 
Table 4.9. The Peace Process Perceptions 
Positives Doubtful Participants Negatives 
Understanding of the 
impossibility to end the conflict 
by violence. 
Fluctuations within the 
process 
Acknowledgment of 
the PKK/APO as an 
actor 
Self-initiated nature of the peace 
process  
Need of time 
Lack of socialization 
of the peace process 
Lack of violence 
International dimension 
of the conflict. 
Peace or 
Democratization 
Process 
    
Not trust the Kurdish 
side 
The second group highlighted the self-initiated nature of the peace process and 
stated this nature provides hope. 
                                                 
71 We know that they want a Kurdish state in that region. The Turkish state and its rulers know this They 
were willing to play this game with them up to a point. Previously, they said they could do it by beating 
them but now they know that this is not possible. Now, we realise that we need to protect that territory 
through mutual agreement 
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Çözüm sürecinin şu tarafı beni çok umutlandırıyor; kendi kendimize bir 
meseleyi çözmek için çalışmamız çok hoşuma gidiyor. (B.M., NGO 
representative) 72 
 
Esasında bu Kürt meselesi ve bu meselenin çözümüyle ilgili bir akil 
heyetin bir çalışma gruplarının oluşturulması, taraflar arasında bir 
diyalog ve iş birliğinin oluşmasına vesile oldu diye düşünüyorum (C.G., 
businessman, NGO representative) 73 
And, the last group mentioned that the lack of violence is a sufficient reason to 
support the peace process.  
 Ben 3 yıldır ölüm haberi duymuyorsam, demek ki bir başarı var 
kardeşim. Ben, ağlamayan annelerin, üzülmeyen kadınların 
yanındayım. (L.C., businessman and NGO representative)74 
The doubtful side of the participants, despite their support for the process, 
shared their reserved feelings regarding the peace process.  The first group at this 
doubtful dimension highlighted the fluctuations within the process and said that these 
fluctuations make them doubtful. 
Umutlanmak istiyorum, inşallah bu çözüm olur ama bir taraftan iyi olur 
diye sevinirken, diğer taraftan en ufak bir şey birdenbire bir kırılma 
noktası oluyor, birdenbire atmosfer değişiyor. (M.K., politician, 
businessman) 75 
 
O, araya çomak sokanlar olmadığı takdirde belki... Misal, niye çözüm 
sürecine karşı çıkıyor bu diğer partiler, ben anlayamıyorum! (T.Y., 
retired politician, businessman) 76 
The second group mentioned the need for time to achieve sustainable peace. 
 Çözmek gerekiyordu. Bu çözüm süreci bir umuttu. Zaman zaman 
engebeli olsa da, ki kolay olmuyor. Asırlar boyunca biriken problemler 
sihirli değnekle çözülmez. Ama meselenin kodlarını okumaya yönelik 
samimi bir gayret olduğunu görüyorum. Ama Zamana ihtiyaç var. 
Umudum da var. (F.A., teacher, bureaucrat) 77 
The third group highlighted the international dimension of the conflict.  
                                                 
72 What gives me hope about the solution process is that I love the fact that we're working on our own 
to resolve a matter. 
73 I think that the establishment of a Committee of Intelligent People was a means for dialogue and 
working together to solve this Kurdish problem. 
74 If I have not heard any news of death for three years, then that is a success. I stand by mothers who 
shouldn’t have to cry for their children and women who should not have to suffer. 
75 I want to get my hopes up, hopefully this process will  provide a solution. However, on the one hand 
I am rejoicing, and on the other hand the slightest thing could be the breaking point and the atmosphere 
could change all of a sudden. 
76 It is possible if there were no obstructionists there... For instance, why are these political parties 
opposed to the solution process? I do not understand! 
77 It should have been solved. This solution process was a hope. Although from time to time it has been 
a bumpy ride and it is not easy. These problems have been accumulating for centuries and will not be 
solved with a magic wand. But I see a genuine desire to truly understand the issue. We need time. I have 
hope, too. 
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Şimdi, çözüm süreci gayet güzel bir çalışma ama, dış güçlerin ne kadar 
oynayacağı çok önemli. Malum, bölge çok karışık. Suriye, Irak... (C.G., 
businessman, NGO representative) 78 
The last dimension was the ones that view the situation negatively, to which I 
refer to as the negatives. This side of the participants stated several arguments made 
the peace process irresolvable. The first group on this side criticized the 
acknowledgment of the PKK or its leader Abdullah Ocalan as an actor of the peace 
process. 
 Metotta bir şeyler değişmeli. Çünkü, devlet böyle her eline silah alıp 
çıkana, ben sana gel bunun karşılığında bir şeyler vereceğim derse, bu 
işin içinden çıkılmaz o zaman yahu. (M.U. pharmacist, religious 
organization representative) 79 
The second group on this side was distressed due to the lack of socialization of 
the peace process. For this side, there is ambiguity within the process and the society 
should have been informed more clearly. 
PKK tarafının yasal ve siyasal yollarını açmak için akil adamlar ortaya 
çıkarıldı, ama bütüncül bir barışı ortaya getirmek için, esas, devletçi, 
memleketçi, ülkeci, bütünlükten yana bir stratejik uzmanlar kadrosu 
milletin önüne serilmedi. Sadece siyasi partilerin söylemleri yetmez. 
(H.E., journalist, NGO representative) 80 
 
Şu anda, süreci kimse bilmiyor ki? Tüm siyasi partiler, bütün STK’lar, 
herkes orada bir faaliyet halinde olmalıydı. Şu anda olamıyor ki? Kim 
var orada? Bakın üç tane aktör var: HDP-PKK işbirliği içinde, AKP, bir 
de HÜDA-PAR. (M.D., teacher, NGO representative) 81 
The third group was uncomfortable due to the naming the process as the 
Kurdish peace process. From their standpoint, this process should have been named as 
the democratization period and should have included various identities throughout the 
country.   
O günden bu yana, bence bu günde çok aşırı fazla değer veriliyor. Ama, 
Bir dönem çok önemsiz, bir dönem de çok önemli, bu defada haksızlık 
olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bence eşit muamele görsünler. O bölgenin 
                                                 
78 Now, the solution process is a very good thing, but, to what extent the external forces will play a role 
is very important. Obviously, the region is very complicated. Look at Syria, Iraq... 
79 Something in the methodology has to change. If the government accepts the demands of everyone 
who takes up arms then we will always be stuck. 
80 The Committe of Intelligent People was established to open up the legal and political paths for the 
PKK. However, a statist cadre of experts for bringing about a holistic peace was not a strategic part of 
the process. Just the rhetoric of the political parties is not enough 
81 Currently, no one knows what is happening with the process. All political parties and NGOs should 
have been there doing something. Right now they cannot. Who is there? There are three actors: HDP-
PKK are in cooperation, there is the AKP, and HUDA-PAR. 
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yapısına uygun devlet oralara imkanları götürsün, ama onlar da vergi 
ödesin yani.  (T.B., businessman, politician) 82 
 
Barış süreci değil, adı, demokratikleşme süreci olarak değiştirilecek 
deniyor. Şimdi, demokratikleşme süreci, sadece bir bölgeyi değil, bütün 
TR’yi şamil insanları kapsayacak şekilde olacakmış, bu çok doğru olur. 
problem sadece bir bölgeye has bir problem değil, demokratikleşmeye 
herkesin ihtiyacı var. (H.E., journalist, NGO representative) 83 
The final group was the most desperate among the negatives. This group has 
no trust in the Kurdish side. “Gidemeyecek, inanmıyorum. Bunlar şimdi bize baştan 
çok güzel gözükecekler, sonra yapacaklar yapacaklarını. (N.S., pharmacist, NGO 
representative) 84” 
The third and the last question aimed to bring out thoughts as to how this 
conflict can be resolved (See Table 4.10).  
Table 4.10. How can this conflict be resolved? 
Individual Level State Level Actor Level: PKK 
Religious References Educational policies 
Elimination of the PKK 
pressure 
Good intention and writing off 
each parties' debts 
Democratic policies 
Disconnect the ties 
between  the PKK and 
international actors 
Knowing each other Need of spesific institutions   
The first group emphasized the religious references, good intention, knowing 
one another, and writing off each party’s debts as the most important tool to end the 
conflict. 
 Özet, yapıcı bir niyet. Diğerleri ikincil....Biz, gerçek kürtleri bulup 
helalleşmemiz gerekiyor. (A.C., businessman, religious organization 
leader) 85 
 
                                                 
82 From that day until now too much  importance has been given to this issue. However at one stage it 
was not considered important, then it was given a lot of... But then this is unfair. I think they need equal 
treatment. The State should provide opportunities according to the structure of the region, but the the 
people there should also pay their taxes. 
83 Some says that the name of the process will be changed from peace process to democratization 
process. The democratization process will not only focus on one region but will encompass the entire 
country. This will be the right thing to do. The problem is not only that region’s problem. Everyone 
needs democratization. 
84 I do not believe them. They will seem attractive to us now, but then, they will do whatever they want.  
85 In summary, a constructive intent. The other issues are secondary... We need to find real Kurds and 
forgive each other. 
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Yıllarca bir arada yaşadık. Beraber kurtuluş savaşı verdik. Terörü bir 
tarafa bırakarak, masaya oturup, nedir talepleri bir düşünmek, 
konuşmak, tartışmak gerek. (O.D., industrialist, intellectual) 86 
The second group generally mentioned the structural state policies to bring an 
end to the conflict such as educational policies, democratic policies, and the need for 
specific institutions.  
 Eğitim ve öğretim sistemini yeniden düzenleyerek. Bu memlekette 
eğitim oldukça sorun olmaz. AKP iktidarından bu yana, TR’de yapılan 
her şey, sektör sektör, çok iyi seviyede yapıldı, ya da standart yükseldi. 
Ama, birey olarak, eğitim sisteminin, sınıfta kaldığını düşünüyorum. 
Bu kitlenin de doğru bilgiyle, doğru eğitimle, doğru öğrenimle 
donanması, bu memleketin aydınlık yarınlara kavuşması olacaktır. 
(C.G., businessman, NGO representative) 87 
 
 Meclise girdiler. Bu meseleyi mecliste çözecekler. Silahların 
bırakılması lazım. Yassıadadaki kişiyle, zaten devamlı kontakt 
halindeler, kimse onları engellemiyor. (T.Y., retired politician, 
businessman) 88 
 
 Bizim en büyük derdimiz ne şu anda, Kürtçülük problemi. Ama, 
Kürtçülük ile ilgili bizim neyimiz var Türkiye’de kurumsal olarak, 
hiçbir şeyimiz yok. Milli politikaya yönelen ve bu sorunu anlayan 
kurumlara ihtiyaç var. (H.E., journalist, NGO representative) 89 
The third group completely focused on the responsibilities of the PKK 
organization and the organization’s international ties.  
 Aşiret ve PKK baskısı kalkmalı. Bireyselleşme olmadan, o adamların 
gerçek ihtiyaçlarını bilemezsin.. PKK, bence, daha üst akıllardan destek 
alıyor. Dışarıdan besleniyor. Kandil orada olduğu sürece, APO ile 
anlaşmak, HDP ile anlaşmak sorunu çözemeyecektir. (M.D., teacher, 
NGO representative) 90 
4.3.  Discussion 
As discussed in the chapter on theory, if a conflict is protracted, violent, 
interpreted as irresolvable, and the parties of the conflict have made extensive 
                                                 
86 We lived together for many years. We fought the War of Independence together. We need to sit down 
and think about, talk about and discuss their demands. 
87 Through the reorganization of the system of training and education. As long as there is education, 
then there will be no problem. Since the AKP, the standards have isen and we had quality in every 
sector. But, individually, the education system has failed. Correct education and information of the 
Kurds will enlighten the future of this country. 
88 They entered the assembly. They need to settle this matter in parliament. They should put down their 
weapons. They are in constant contact with the man at Yassıada. Nobody is preventing them. 
89 What is our biggest problem now? The problem of Kurdish nationalism. What institutions do we have 
concerning Kurdish nationalism? Nothing! There is a need for institutions that are directed towards 
national politics and that understand these issues. 
90 Tribal and PKK pressure should be eliminated. Without individualism, one cannot know their real 
needs. I think the PKK receives support from higher minds. It is being nourished by external groups 
Agreement with APO or HDP will not solve the problem as long as Kandil remains.  
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investments due to violent actions (Kriesberg, 1998); in addition, if it has a multi-
dimensional nature and possesses a central place in the society (Bar-Tal, 2007), one 
can call this conflict an intractable conflict. The author of the research calls the Kurdish 
conflict an intractable conflict as discussed in the first chapter. As I mentioned in the 
introduction of the thesis, this study assumes that in the course of conflict, both 
members of the parties involved in the conflict develop a socio-psychological 
infrastructure (SPI) to adapt the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007) and without transformation 
within the SPI, building sustainable peace is not completely possible (Bar-Tal, 2000; 
Kelman 2007; Lederach 2003; Mitchell 2014). In other words, the objective of this 
study is to evaluate the response of the Turkish society to the peace process and 
examine the general characteristics of the Turkish ethos of the Kurdish conflict 
(TEOC). In addition, the study aims to demonstrate how the ethos of the conflict 
(EOC) impacts societies’ perception of social reality.  
The first and the most important assumption of this thesis was that the EOC 
performs a moral function and provides an action guide for the society involved in the 
conflict. In this sense, the TEOC aids individuals within the Turkish society to 
encounter the challenges of the conflict, namely the (1) satisfaction of basic needs such 
as safety, positive identity, needs of knowing, (Burton, 1990), (2) withstanding the 
Kurds,  (3) and copping with stress (Bar-Tal and Salomon, 2006). The results of the 
research met my expectations and indicated that each of the eight themes were 
involved within the TEOC. Although each of the shared beliefs was unique, all of them 
feed the holistic orientation (Bar-Tal, Halperin, Sharvit, and Zafran, 2012). In other 
words, each of the shared beliefs complements one another and constructs common 
explanations regarding the ongoing intractable Kurdish conflict.  On the one hand, 
TEOC prepares the Turkish society for violent conditions and facilitates adaptation to 
the potential harmful conditions of violent confrontations. On the other hand, TEOC 
suggests that the TG is just and fundamental for secure life by motivating and guiding 
the Turkish society for solidarity and action. 
This also demonstrates how the TEOC manages patriotic shared beliefs within 
the Turkish society. Findings of the research show that for the Turkish society, 
securing indivisible territorial integrity has been seen as an ultimate purpose of the 
state. Therefore, if this purpose seems under attack, all policies of the state can be seen 
as pardonable, excusable, and justifiable. Therefore, the TEOC morally justifies the 
Turkish states’ and Turkish members’ acts, intentional harm, and aggression towards 
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the Kurds, consisting of destruction, killings, and violence. Therefore, the Turkish 
society disposes of guilt, shame, and dissonance through the moral functionality of the 
TEOC (Bar-Tal, 2007).  
The second assumption of this thesis was that in the Kurdish conflict, the EOC 
serves as a common ideology within the society and functions as a prism that 
influences evaluation of the social reality in the context of the intractable Kurdish 
conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007, 2013) In general, although the participants were chosen 
from different religious backgrounds and political camps (religious/secular, 
conservative / nationalist / republican / others), the findings of the research indicates 
that all of the participants shares the very same EOC in terms of four themes of shared 
beliefs , respectively de-legitimization of the KG, justness of the TG, security, 
patriotism, and victimization. (See Table 4.11) More clearly, without exception, for all 
of the participants,  
 Turkish state and TSK should be evaluated as just as they sought to secure 
indivisible territorial integrity.  
 Turkish side is the most victimized side of the conflict.  
 There are several identities that victimized at least as much as the Kurdish identity. 
Maybe the victimization of the Kurdish people or the region can be acknowledged 
associated with the past but today there is no any evidence to support the Kurdish 
victimization. Due these bloody developments, the Turkish state’s territorial 
integrity and its national security are under threat.  
Therefore, all of the Turkish people are ready to die or fight against the 
opponents. EOC theory claims the shared beliefs about the justness of the TG and de-
legitimization of the KG allow the Turkish society to believe that the conflict is 
intransigent and the Kurdish side is the only blamable side for eruption and 
maintenance of the Kurdish conflict, and for the outbreak of all armed confrontations, 
and the Kurdish side is only responsible side for the failure of past peace initiatives 
(Bar-Tal, 2009). Moreover, due to this theme, Turkish society views itself as right and 
humane and the most victimized side of the Kurdish conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007).   
Thus, the theme of the de-legitimization of the KG, for the Turkish society 
eases passing the responsibility regarding eruption and continuation of the conflict 
(Bar-Tal, 2013). This theme also helps to legitimize violence to the opponent. Hence, 
de-legitimization theme consists of a significant ideological assumption that clarifies 
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the events during the conflict and encouraged the society for acting against the 
opponent (Bar-Tal, 1990).  
These were the crucial and fundamental common findings that create 
homogeneity within the EOC. However, there were some levels of TEOC impacts on 
other shared beliefs and this differentiation lead to heterogeneity within the TEOC.  
First, in my sample, the participants with higher TEOC saw the Kurdish 
people’s negative characteristics as the cause of their violence preference, completely 
rejected the education in mother tongue and self-governance demands, additionally 
perceive these demands as separatist demands, and were completely against marriages 
with the Kurdish people. On the other hand, the participants with a lower EOC stated 
the Turkish state’s past wrong policies as one dimension for their violence preference 
and mentioned the impossibility of blaming only the Kurdish people, even some 
participants made a distinction between the PKK and the Kurdish society, some 
participants even see the education-in-mother-tongue demand as possible, and were 
open to marriage with the Kurdish people. However, even the participants with low 
EOC were against to self-governance demands of the Kurdish side.   
Second, in line with the EOC theory, participants with higher TEOC evaluated 
the Kurdish people with very negative stereotypes and the Turkish people with very 
positive repertoire than the participants with lower TEOC. Furthermore, those with a 
higher TEOC were speaking with a high aggressiveness regarding the Kurdish people. 
Participants with lower TEOC, however, evaluated the Kurdish people with both 
positive and relatively negative stereotypes, even some claimed that to make a 
distinction between a Turk and a Kurds is impossible. 
Third, the negative view towards the Kurdish people can also explain the 
attributions of one-way blame to the Kurdish side. I can claim that, during the years of 
the Kurdish conflict, Turkish society constructed several beliefs that reject the Kurds’ 
humaneness. The findings show that, some higher level EOC participants perceive the 
Kurdish people as totally cruel and primitive.  
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Figure 4.1. Socio-Psychological Infrastructure (SPI) of the Turkish Society 
This whole structure and a set of contents of TEOC demonstrate that it is really 
possible to perceive the EOC as an ideology that describes the conflict and its related 
tasks. The findings indicate the TEOC in fact provide a common socio-psychological 
adaptation for the society. It makes clear explanations available, represents a societal 
view, and helps establishing an epistemological basis associated with the Kurdish 
conflict, and causes cognitive selectivity and biases (Bar-Tal, 2009). As a holistic 
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narrative, the ideological mode of the TEOC shapes the society’s mind and lead to 
dogmatism and mental rigidity (Rokeach, 1960; Sorrentino and Roney, 2000). 
Therefore, through the aid of the TEOC the Turkish society cut loose from the 
ambiguity character of the social reality. Ambiguity of the world become more 
meaningful by the TEOC (Burton, 1990, Staub, 2011, Bar-Tal and Salomon, 2006) 
and the future situations become more predictable (Bar-Tal, Halperin, Sharvit, and 
Zafran, 2012). Moreover, the ideological and epistemic function eases coping with 
stress, as it needs clarified schemes to understand stressful conditions (Bar-Tal, e.g.).   
The third assumption of the thesis was that the EOC performs a societal 
function for the Turkish society. In other words, the EOC contributes the formation, 
maintenance, and strengthening of the Turkish social identity (Bar-Tal, 2000). 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), motivations for 
improving the social esteem deepen the rejection of other groups. Therefore, the 
negative perceptions of the participants with higher TEOC regarding the Kurdish 
identity can be interpreted as the impact of social identity function of the TEOC. First, 
the security and territorial integrity threats most probably initiated negative 
generalizations associated with the Kurds (Stephan and Stephan, 2000). Second, the 
Turkish society considers unity as a unity of territory, unity of language, and unity of 
national ideals. Therefore, these shared beliefs strongly determine the attitudes 
towards the demands of a self-government and right to education in the mother tongue, 
expressed by the Kurds. However, on the other hand, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) 
argue that in each case, whether to form a society or a group, individuals must identify 
themselves with a social identity that points out their membership for a society to exist. 
Therefore, it is also a prerequisite and basic need to bind members together in the 
Turkish society (Tajfel, 1982). At a collective level, members of the Turkish society 
satisfy their need for security and belonging through their social identity affected by 
the intractable Kurdish conflict. Social identity increases in-group cohesiveness and 
solidarity. Solidarity and cohesiveness are the two phenomena that mobilize the 
society to act for the sake of the society (Bar-Tal, 2000). So, social identity reflects 
continuing experiences and circumstances of the Kurdish conflict and explains how 
the TEOC mobilizes members of the society to sacrifice themselves for their own 
society and why the generalized negative stereotypes toward the Kurds are gradually 
embedded in the Turkish society, especially by the younger generation (Bar-Tal, 
 81 
 
2007). At this point, one can easily assume that the security thread and generalized 
negative stereotypes negativity consolidate each other.   
The fourth assumption of the thesis was that the EOC creates a perception of 
superiority for the society involved in the conflict. In the findings of the research, the 
tradition of governance of the Turks was the remarkable feature the participants noted. 
This emphasis can be considered as an implicit perception of the superiority of the 
Turks for some proportions of the Turkish society. On the other hand, commonly 
shared beliefs on the de-legitimization of the KG, honoring the Turkish state’s 
counterattacks on the PKK, acknowledged in-group victimization, and the relatively 
lack of differentiation between the PKK and the Kurdish identity can all be considered 
a differentiation process among the two identities and the impact of high TEOC. 
Within the context of the conflict, since these types of differentiations reinforce the 
rigidity of the TEOC (Bar-Tal, 2013), they can be evaluated as major boundaries or 
obstacles to make achieve resolution of the Kurdish conflict.  
The final assumption of the thesis was that EOC restricts the perception of 
peace and make people think peace is a wish, a hope, and even a dream. The findings 
of the thesis indicated that the participants with a higher TEOC think that the peace 
between Kurds and Turks is impossible. The second problem in conflictual zones is to 
think peace as a lack of psychological violence, namely the negative peace perception 
(Galtung, 1990). Although the participants with a lower TEOC perceive achieving 
peace as possible, the findings indicates that they understand establishing peace in a 
negative way rather than that achieving lack of violence with establishing just 
institutions to stop structural violence at the same time (Galtung, 1967). The most 
important point that should be mentioned here is the possible impact of shared beliefs 
about victimization on the perception of peace. Even the participants with a lower 
TEOC think that there are no longer any victimization of the Kurds by pointing 
economic investments in the region, democratic policies on using their language, and 
democratic opportunities to be in the TBMM. Therefore, all of the requirements for 
establishing peace are made according to these participants.  
4.4.  Need for Change 
Over the last decades, social scientists working on conflict resolution has 
become more focused on the reconciliation concept (Kriesberg, 1998; Rothstein, 1999; 
Lederach, 1997; Keogh and Haltzel, 1993) rather than focusing entirely on all phases 
of conflicts. Since the resolution of the conflict engaged in prolonged violence requires 
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a well-designed reconciliation process (Bar-Tal, 2000b), scholars became to think that 
the paradigm shift in the literature was inevitable. When such an armed conflict 
proceeds for so many decades, there is significant growth of hatred, prejudice, and 
animosity; CM is developed by issues regarding the conflict; several cultural products 
become more antagonistic; common negative shared beliefs are imprinted and are 
gathered in the EOC; and at least one generation within the society has grown up in 
the conflictual conditions (Bar-Tal, 2000b). 
That situation very applies to the inter-ethnic conflict in Turkey. Then, the 
question of how one conflict reach and achieve a reconciliation process can be 
meaningful at that point. In theory, there is no one type of reconciliation for prolonged-
violent conflicts due to characteristics of conflicts. Whether the outcome of formal 
resolution of the conflict is that the two parties of the conflict must proceed to live in 
one common political system (e.g. Turkey, Bosnia, Rwanda, El Salvador) or will live 
in two different political systems and states (e.g. France and Germany) is a determinant 
to choose reconciliation form. While in the first form, the parties should establish one 
common economic, political, cultural, and even educational system that integrate the 
two past adversary groups, in the second form, the past rivals can continue to live in 
two different political systems. Thus, the first form necessitates the construction of 
new peaceful and cooperative system to establish trust. In the second form, however, 
reconciliation process solely focuses on the bilateral relations of two parties from two 
different countries.  
Although there should be different dimensions and types of reconciliation, all 
of the disciplines focused on this issue acknowledges that reconciliation necessitates 
socio-psychological transformation (transformation of beliefs and attitudes) whether 
the outcome of the reconciliation requires live in the same state or not (Bar-Tal, 
2000b). Reconciliation concept in the socio-psychological discipline can be 
considered as a cultural and social process that includes the majority of the members 
of the parties involved in the conflict, who will construct new shared beliefs regarding 
the opponents, about their own socio-culture, and associated with the confrontations 
and relationships of the two parties (Bar-Tal, 2000b).  
It should be noted that although the conflict resolution and negotiation 
processes accelerates the process of reconciliation, transformation of social shared 
beliefs may take many years, and even many decades after the signed agreements 
between the two parties. In the context of the Kurdish conflict, the socio-psychological 
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dimension of reconciliation has special significance as it refers to transformation of 
the deep-rooted TEOC. As discussed in the previous part, TEOC fuels and establishes 
psychological barriers to its resolution. Thus, transformation of the TEOC is at the 
heart of the process of reconciliation. TEOC fulfills an ideological, epistemic, moral, 
and societal function for Turkish society. It creates a perception of superiority and 
prepares the Turkish society for violent conditions. 
Therefore, the question here is: can the TEOC change? If so, how? Bar-Tal 
(2000, pp.77) states, “Societal beliefs are durable, but not stable, as they may change 
with time”. In other words, it is not static, but can transform over time. I mean the 
TEOC can also weaken or strengthen. The findings of the research also support that 
the members of the society may live either lower or higher TEOC. To determine a 
vision to achieve the transformation of the TEOC, there are three key obstacles to 
prepare society for a sustainable peace: justness of the TG, de-legitimization of the 
KG, positive self-image and negative image of the Kurdish identity, and shared beliefs 
about peace (Bar-Tal, 2000b). 
First of all, transformation of the TEOC requires the change in the shared 
beliefs about the justness of the TG. Turkish society legitimizes the TG by depending 
on indivisible territorial integrity or securing territorial integrity. To remove the 
cognitive-psychological fundamentals of the conflict, these types of shared beliefs 
need to be changed. In essence, this condition necessitates postponement or abolition 
or redefinition of the social visions and dreams that cause the continuation of the 
Kurdish conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000b). Peace agreements between the two parties of the 
conflict may be a fundamental catalyst of this transformation which is aimed to remove 
central contradictions between the TG and the KG. However, the official outcome of 
these agreements, arranged by the formal representatives of the two parties, must be 
translated into the formation of new TG and KG and their related beliefs. The outcome 
should transform the content and symbols of the TEOC (Bar-Tal, 2000b).  The process 
of reconciliation between Germany and France after the World War Two ensamples 
that the transformation in shared beliefs about societal goals. From prolonged armed-
conflict period and several contradictions of their goals to emerged new societal goals 
for both Germany and France, which focused on common goals and collaboration. 
Franco-German relations served as a founder pillar of the economic and political union 
of Europe (Ackermann, 1994; Willis, 1965). Therefore, this experience illustrates that 
a reconciliation, which abolishes all contradictions between the goals of the parties 
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and establishes desirable new aims, can allow living in peaceful coexistence with the 
adversaries and building collaborative relations between the opposing groups.   
Second, transformation of the TEOC requires transformation of the negative 
images and stereotypes of the Kurdish identity. De-legitimization through thirty years 
unfortunately leads to negative image constructions and boundaries within the society. 
In essence, although the disposal of the stereotypes is impossible, the transformation 
of the shared negative images of the Kurdish identity may be achieved by balancing 
new stereotyping of the Kurdish identity (Bar-Tal, 2013). This means construction of 
positive images to negative images in any event because in order to establish a 
sustainable peace, the progressing de-legitimization process should disappear. These 
new stereotyping initiative will also help individuals to perceive Kurdish people not 
as a homogeneous group of people but as a group encompassing several different 
subgroups with distinct worldviews and characteristics (Bar-Tal, 2000b). All of these 
transformations are supposed to impact a new mindset, improve trust within the both 
Turkish and Kurdish sides, allow both sides of the conflict to consider each other’s 
needs, and create a perception that sees the Kurdish or Turkish people as a partner to 
coexist on the very same territory and in the common political and economic system. 
Third, transformation of the TEOC requires transformation of the positive self-
images of the Turkish society, which glorify and praise the Turkish society in contrast 
to the Kurdish society. The transformation should provide a more objective 
perceptions particularly associated with the past and present events of the intractable 
conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). Therefore, the new constructed perceptions must be more 
critical and multi-dimensional. The new perception should be able to evaluate the 
Turkish in-group contribution to the outbreak of the Kurdish conflict (if any) as well 
as the contribution of the Kurdish side. Such a transformation may have a tremendous 
impact on changing in the monopolistic shared beliefs about the victimization. The 
society should become recognize the victimization of both Turkish and Kurdish groups 
in the Kurdish conflict. According to Handl (1997), Czech-German Declaration, 
signed in 1997, can be shown as an example how declaration transform the self-in-
group-images of both Czechs and Germans by making past unjust events explicit.  
Fourth, the transformation of the positive self-images of Turkish society and 
negative images of the Kurdish identity may develop new relations between the 
Turkish and Kurdish side through providing a persuasive rationale. As for the future, 
the Turkish and Kurdish society should improve friendlier and more cooperative 
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beliefs. According to Bar-Tal, past experience in all over the world demonstrates that 
reconstruction of the past in mindsets is a crucial part of the reconciliation process, 
because the CM is developed with selective manner, mistrust, misdeeds of the 
opponent, hatred, and even animosity between the both sides of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 
2000b). Thus, the transformation of the evaluation of the Turkish should be providing 
a balanced discourse with a critical examination in a more objective manner.  
Finally, transformation of the TEOC requires transformation of the shared 
beliefs about peace and reassessment regarding the nature of peace. As discussed, on 
the one side peace can be perceived as a utopian aim, on the other hand peace can be 
perceived as just lack of physical violence without determining the nature or culture 
of peace or any useful tools to reach it. However, reconciliation necessitates new-
shared beliefs that assess the necessary requirements (peaceful mechanisms such as 
negotiation, mediation, even arbitration) for living in peace (Bar-Tal, 2000b). 
Therefore, the Turkish society should understand and acknowledge the necessity of 
concession and compromise to achieve the sustainable peace after the thirty years 
armed conflict.  
In sum, all of these findings, discussions, and analysis indicates and claims that 
the Kurdish conflict has developed a TEOC within the society and the normalization 
or reconciliation process requires several transformations and replacements of the 
share beliefs of the TEOC. The core needed transformations concerning conflictive-
shared beliefs about the legitimization of the TG, de-legitimization of the KG, positive 
self-images of the Turkish society, negative images of the Kurdish society, and peace 
in order to establish the ethos of peace (Bar-Tal, 2013). Constitution of the ethos of 
peace in Turkey does not disqualify the shared beliefs about security, unity, patriotism, 
and even positive self-image of the Turkish society. Cohesive mobilization, basis for 
belonging, protection of society requires all of these mentioned four shared beliefs 
themes, even they are a basic need of the Turkish society. Hence, the transformation 
of the TEOC should not be understood as the rejection of these four themes. Whether 
in conflictual period or peaceful period, these four themes are very crucial and 
functional to survival of both the Turkish and Kurdish society as well. However, to 
being multi-dimensional and being open to discuss are still important in terms of these 
four themes as well as for other core themes.  
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4.5.  Implications 
To move from the armed conflict stage to reconciliation stage in the intractable 
Kurdish conflict, the mentioned transformations of the TEOC represent a really 
complicated process with various obstacles.  
First and foremost, as I discussed earlier TEOC makes a great contribution to 
the Turkish society’s social identity. Shared beliefs within the TEOC provide the 
epistemological basis related to meaning of membership in the Turkish society. Thus, 
the transformation initiative of these shared beliefs can be perceived as a threat to the 
members of the Turkish society, who does not want to lose a connective norm that 
binds the members of the Turkish society together (Oren, 2009).  
Second, many of the shared beliefs of the TEOC are well based in the Turkish 
society. In the course of thirty years conflict, several educational, political, cultural, 
and social institutions and products publicize the contents of these beliefs and aid the 
society to retain them. In Turkey, one can found several books, films, literature, and 
leader’s speeches that propagate and disseminate these beliefs of the Kurdish conflict 
without alternatives (Bar-Tal, 2000b).  
Third, there are generations from both sides of the Kurdish conflict who are 
socialized in light of the Kurdish conflict obtaining the TEOC with its symbols and 
stereotypes. Therefore, the mindset of these youth generations is extremely 
challenging to transform. 
Fourth, more importantly the TEOC serves as an ideological source through 
the Kurdish conflict for all different political camps in Turkey as a credo, and even a 
raison d’être (Bar-Tal, 2000b). Hence, even the minor modifications within the TEOC 
may lead to the strongest challenges. 
Fifth, the Turkish society may develop some social mechanisms to defend 
TEOC climate to maintain coping with the stress. Individuals, groups, or even political 
parties may construct some formal or informal objection mechanisms when they feel 
any deviation from the TEOC. For instance, various objections from other political 
parties such as MHP can be understood in this way because established TEOC are 
seemed as validated reality for the group members. Therefore, the developed social 
mechanisms may attempt to stop or reject or block the construction of alternative 
explanations of the Kurdish conflict or ideas to solve it.   
Although these difficulties are the obstacles for the transformation of the 
TEOC, the peace process in Turkey should involve this change. In order to start and 
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develop this process, the appropriate social climate for openness for alternative 
explanations and ideas should be came into existence. Therefore, political, cultural, 
educational, and social channels of communications that consist of all social 
institutions, such as NGOs should evolved not only in an official way but also in an 
informal way. I mean, the peace process should be publicized or socialized. There are 
some social factors to achieve the public peace process. 
First, the determinative factor for sustainable peace process is a signed 
agreement between the parties of the conflict. Without the agreement, moving from 
the armed-conflict stage to the normalization and reconciliation stages is all but 
impossible. 
Second, good will, mutual symbolic acts of peace and concession, wish tone in 
the leaders’ statements, evolvement of institutions to support the peace process should 
come into exist and reflect the desire to transform the TEOC.  
Third, international context is very important for the Turkey’s peace process. 
The Syrian war and its political and security implications have very strong impacts on 
the Kurdish conflict. However, to construct a peace ethos and new common goals for 
both parties of the Kurdish conflict, international context should be used by both 
parties to create supportive conditions and peaceful pressure from influential inter-
national or supra-national allies.  
Fourth, strong objections of official political parties and/or social organizations 
to the peace process, which have influence on the public, may procrastinate the public 
peace process by proceeding de-legitimization the members of the both parties of the 
conflict, which feeds the tension of the Kurdish conflict. The successful public peace 
process in Turkey necessitates establishment of wide-range and wide-spread support 
from the society to dilute the impact of oppositional actions to the peace process. 
Fifth, political and social leaders and decision makers and their open support 
have crucial roles on their followers in terms of mobilization of the support of the 
peace process. The followers take them as models to think or act.  
Finally, the impact of mobilization of cultural and educational institutions in 
the public peace process is very important. The educational policies may help the 
prejudiced youth to think alternative ideas and understand the importance of living in 
peace with the past opponent. Peace education policies may aid transformation of the 
shared beliefs and negative repertoire of the both societies. In addition, the cultural 
elite may contribute to the process via several cultural products such as films, books, 
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documentaries, or plays by providing new symbols of peace ethos and can help 
establishment of the peace culture.  
In sum, these are the list of all possible dynamics that can impact the peace 
process in Turkey in terms of socio-psychological conceptual framework. This thesis 
sought to point out the importance and potential determinative influence of socio-
psychological transformation in the TEOC. On the other hand, the research attempted 
to defend that socio-psychological dimension should be considered as an essential part 
of the peace process in Turkey because solely formal initiatives to resolve the Kurdish 
conflict provides no assurance to transform well-rooted political, social, economic, and 
psychological repertoire in the mindset of the society. The important point is that 
exclusion of the socio-psychological dimension from the road map of the peace 
process may lead to resurrection of the Kurdish conflict, as happened in July 2015.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The central research questions of the research were: “How does the society 
respond to the peace process? What is the impact of ethos on responses? Is the Turkish 
society resistant to change? If yes, why? If not, why?” In order to provide a persuasive 
framework to explain why people resist change, I specifically focused on the socio-
psychological perspective of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Today, tens of cases 
indicate building peace in a society involved in intractable conflict points to a long-
term commitment that seeks to create a new atmosphere across the levels of a society. 
Establishing social agreement depends on the contributions of multiple actors and 
activities targeted to accomplish negotiation and sustain peace. In this sense, I asserted 
that the socio-psychological dimension of the conflict offers a beneficial approach as 
to what factors prevent the resurrection of the conflict in the future, and unless taking 
precautions, all of the conflicts may revive. If these shared beliefs could be determined, 
peace builders and politicians could develop more effective strategies and policies to 
transform the conflict. Shared beliefs address the central and implicit problematics, 
stereotypes, concerns, and prejudices among the members associated with ongoing 
conflict feeding the continuation of the conflict. Thus, this thesis sought to provide a 
comprehensive analytical framework to shed light on the preventing character of the 
Turkish ethos in the peace process. 
The findings of the research revealed there is relatively implicit resistance to 
change in the Turkish society due to the TEOC and its functionality. I proposed that 
the TEOC is part of the cognitive repertoire of the Turkish society that evolves in the 
context of the prolonged and intractable Kurdish conflict and provides a coherent and 
systematic orientation to the Turkish society regarding the ongoing conflict. 
Chapter one provided a solid background for the Kurdish question. It addressed 
the major-minor parties, the history and context of the conflict, the core issues of the 
conflict, and the internal and external dynamics of the conflict. In addition, it discussed 
the past peace initiatives for the Kurdish question. As a whole, it provided significant 
historical breaking points that shaped the mindset and repertoire within the Turkish 
society.  
Chapter two presented the theoretical framework of the research and explained 
why conflicts are dynamic phenomena. It sought to demonstrate that conflicts might 
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escalate or deescalate because of the roles of complex interactions of behavior and 
attitudes. In this sense, this chapter claimed conflicts should be considered as multi-
dimensional realities and CR has multi-phase characteristics. Therefore, peace should 
not be viewed as an event, rather, it should be perceived as a process.  On the other 
hand, to establish sustainable peace, conflict resolution strategies should involve 
middle-ranged actors as they have a vital role for the public peace. Finally, this chapter 
explained how the socio-psychological infrastructure of the conflict and EOC makes 
it difficult to resolve conflict by working as a rigid prism, and it claimed that without 
a transformation within the ethos of the conflict, building a sustainable peace is not 
completely possible. 
In chapter three, I formulated central and sub-research questions for the 
research by limiting the scope of the research to fill in a gap in the literature. 
Additionally, I demonstrated the methodology of the research and explained how this 
research would contribute to the field. In fact, the present research provides new data 
from Turkish party members’ shared beliefs on the Kurdish question and their 
perceptions on the current peace process. It also demonstrates the current conditions 
of the peace process. Even though it is crucial to research further the social attitudes 
and behavior separately, the study of the ethos of conflict theory enables a more 
comprehensive and complete perception of the society.  
In Chapter Four, I analyzed the findings of the research. Primarily, I 
categorized the contents of the findings. The contents of the findings showed that the 
Turkish society legitimizes its goals by stressing the indivisible territorial integrity of 
the Turkish state, de-legitimizes the Kurdish goals, believes that Turkey’s territorial 
integrity is under attack, possesses positive self-images and negative images of the 
Kurds, and thinks the Turkish society is the most victimized part of the society. The 
functionality of categorizations in terms of eight themes of the TEOC was also 
discussed. The study discussed that the TEOC has epistemic, moral, ideological, and 
societal functions within the society. It impacts the perception of superiority and the 
preparation of the Turkish society for violent conditions. Depending on the findings, I 
concluded that there is implicit resistance to change in the Turkish society. 
This research is one of the first to study the ethos of conflict theory for the 
Kurdish question. The present study reveals that the Turkish society has relatively 
strong barriers to resolve the conflict. In addition, it indicates that the TEOC may 
include very strong and rigid thinking. The homogeneity of the TEOC can be showed 
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as evidence to support this argumentation. Throughout the research I provided various 
insights, roadmaps, and implications in order to transform the TEOC. The research 
claimed Turkey needs a transformation of the TEOC and this can be achieved via three 
general categories: (1) reevaluation of shared societal beliefs acquired and constructed 
during the prolonged conflict, (2) openness for new alternative information, and (3) 
acceptance of new ideas raised by alternative communication channels. To realize 
these steps, Turkey needs comprehensive inclusion of various actors to the process. 
Without inclusion, Turkey cannot succeed in establishing sustainable peace and peace 
cannot be established in spite of the anxieties of the society. Further, Turkey needs a 
new vision of positive peace to avoid doomed misery. 
Recommendations  
The present study raised a number of questions in need of further research. The 
PKK-Turkey conflict has lasted over thirty years. Over this long period, there have 
been bloody conflicts, attempts to resolve the conflict, and a solution process between 
parties. There are a large number of studies, reports, and research on the outbreaks of 
the conflict, solution maps, and strategies to solve the conflict. The present research 
points to another significant approach to the conflict, the EOC, which explains the 
socio-psychological dimension of the conflict and its impact on the attitudes of the 
members of the society.  
The scope of the research is limited to examining the EOC in the public 
discourse. However, there are several other areas to examine regarding the EOC such 
as schoolbooks, mass media, cultural products (i.e. films, series, dramas, and so on), 
as well as the discourse of the leaders. These areas should be researched from the past 
to present to reveal how the EOC was created, extended, institutionalized, and 
maintained.  
Additional research needs to be conducted in order to focus on how the EOC 
can be changed and transformed, under what conditions and with which tools. Specific 
policies and strategies must be advanced to build sustainable peace. However, to 
develop a comprehensive toolbox, there must be additional works focusing on the 
Kurdish ethos of the Kurdish question. A more detailed comparative analysis of the 
Turkish and Kurdish ethos would provide a better picture as a whole of the shared 
beliefs of societies in Turkey. Comparing the experiences of all members the whole 
society within the direct and periphery zones would be useful for the evaluation of 
contrary-shared beliefs created in the society. 
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Finally, it is important to note I do not claim the EOC theory is the most 
comprehensive explanation for the current conflict. But, on the other hand, I support 
the idea that the EOC should be considered as an integral part of the conflict. Second, 
the EOC is not the only component of the psychological dimensions of the conflict 
that advances major resistance to change or to negotiate with the opponent. However, 
in my view, the EOC includes the most important psychological repertoire that affects 
the attitudes regarding the armed conditions of conflict. 
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APPENDICES 
A. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. Please describe yourself in a few words. 
2. What are the main causes of outbreak of the Kurdish conflict? 
3. Some of the Kurds claim that they have suffered a lot in Turkey. What do you 
think about this claim?  
4. Why did Kurds resort to violence?  
5. How do you evaluate the relationship between the Turkish state and Kurdish 
citizens?  
6. What do you think about the solution process? Are you hopeful about the 
process’ future? 
7. What are the positive characteristics of Kurds?  
8. What are the main characteristics that differentiates Turks from Kurds?  
9. What do you think about the PKK?  
10. What are the main ties binding Turks and Kurds together?  
11. How do you define the word of peace?  
12. Do you consider that the Kurdish question impacted you and the society? How? 
And to what extent? 
13. How would you consider a marriage of a member of your family with a Kurdish 
person? 
14. According to you, how the Kurdish conflict should be resolved?  
15. There is demand from the Kurdish citizens regarding education in mother 
tongue. How do you evaluate this demand? 
16. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
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B. PARTICIPANTS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
 
Code Age Education Marriage Occupation 
Kurds in 
Family 
Visiting 
to the 
East 
B.I. 71 
High 
School 
Married 
Retired, Müfti, 
Merchant 
Non YES 
N.A. 65 B.A. Married 
Media owner, 
NGO 
representative 
Non YES 
L.C. 50 B.A. Married 
Businessman, 
NGO 
Representative 
Non YES 
O.A. 57 B.A. Married 
Businessman, rel. 
org representative  
Non YES 
T.Y. 67 B.A. Married 
Retired politician, 
businessman 
YES NO 
T.B. 45 
High 
School 
Married 
Businessman, 
politician 
Non YES 
N.S. 63 B.A. Unmarried 
Pharmacist, NGO 
Representative 
Non YES 
M.S. 87 
High 
School 
Married 
Intellectual, 
journalist 
Non NO 
M.D. 55 M.A. Married 
Teacher, NGO 
Representative 
YES YES 
H.E. 63 B.A. Married 
Journalist, NGO 
representative 
Non YES 
A.C. 48 M.A. Married 
Businessman, rel. 
org representative 
Non YES 
F.A. 53 M.A. Married 
Teacher, 
bureaucrat 
Non YES 
B.M. 58 B.A. Married 
NGO 
Representative 
Non YES 
M.K. 53 
High 
School 
Unmarried 
Politician, 
businessman 
Non YES 
C.G. 47 
High 
School 
Widowed 
Businessman, 
NGO 
Representative 
Non YES 
O.D. 75 B.A. Married 
Industrialist, 
Intellectual 
Non YES 
M.U. 57 B.A. Married 
Pharmacist, Rel. 
org representative 
Non NO 
R.U. 49 B.A. Married Doctor, Executive Non YES 
R.C.   41 B.A. Married Media owner YES YES 
N.C.   45 B.A. Married 
Media owner, 
NGO 
representative 
YES YES 
 
